

JPRS-WER-84-127

19 October 1984

West Europe Report



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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WEST EUROPE REPORT

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WALLOON, FLEMISH SOCIALISTS QUARREL ON EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

Cools Attacks Flemish Socialists

Brussels LE SOIR in French 26 Sep 84 p 2

[Interview with Andre Cools, deputy from Liege, former minister, former president of the PS [Socialist Party] and president of the Walloon Regional Council, by C.F.; time and place of interview not specified]

[Text] "As far as I am concerned, the SP [Dutch-speaking wing of Socialist Party] no longer exists...I do not believe our relations still have any reason for being."

It is Andre Cools speaking. A deputy from Liege, former minister, former president of the PS and president of the Walloon Regional Council, his position is somewhat on the fringe of his party's daily activities, while he is still, in his words, "one who is sick with socialism." We wanted to get his conclusions on the last congress of the Socialist Party, and ask him about the reality and the consequences of the federalist commitment of the PS. Must Ernest Glinne be considered a man alone? Do the recent choices made by the PS place it on the fringe of government life? With what Flemings and what francophones can it hope to reach an understanding? To do what? These are some of the themes we brought up with him.

Andre Cools: The "Happart affair" is still being talked about. But I blame Ernest Glinne for having acted dishonestly. For having seen the malaise created by the arrival in our ranks of Jose Happart and for having exploited, after the event, his own personal ends. Because in the past this man has often made federalist choices. His reaction is not the result of a debate on ideas, but that of a disappointed man, who has often been mistaken and who, after the event, is spitting in the soup.

[Question] But on Sunday he wasn't the only one opposing the federalist radicalization of the Party?

[Answer] There is no radicalization! History is forgotten so quickly...What amazes me is that some people are surprised today at the federalist commitments

of the PS. The line was drawn in the 1960s, at our Verviers congress. And personally, as president of the party in the 1970s, I always followed that line in my long battle for federalism, in which I was so often knocked around.

Against the Flemish Excesses

[Question] However, the Happart affair marks a turning point of sorts, especially in your relations with the SP.

[Answer] Yes, and that's the most important thing. We no longer have any interlocutors in Flanders. But there, too, the line was drawn at the moment the Flemish Socialists were placing at their head a man who was the embodiment of the nationalistic trend and the linguistic trauma. Van Miert, don't forget, was elevated to Brussels. It's all over today. The SP doesn't exist any more as far as I'm concerned.

[Question] It's embarrassing instead. By breaking with the SP, aren't you cutting yourself off from any possibility of returning to the government some day?

[Answer] Not at all! A party is meant to govern, sooner or later, and as Spitaels says, we have no favorite interlocutors, only favorite objectives. But if there is radicalization today, it was caused by the Flemish excesses! Their logical consequence--and what I hope--could be the strengthening of Walloon sentiment. The Flemish nation was forged as a reaction against the imperialism of the francophones. Our nation could become mature fighting Flemish excesses.

[Question] Making Jose Happart a part, first, of the European list and then of the party's list, might look like running away, from a linguistic point of view.

[Answer] Let's stop thinking of "linguistics" as something isolated. The community life is economic and social! As a priority, exclusively! And Walloons are seeing this more and more, whether or not they are Socialists. Look at Happart himself. He isn't a man of the right, a landowner! He is a small Christian farmer who is actually living the tragedy of Belgium. In that sense, his membership in the PS stands for something other than an electoral statistic.

Farmers are becoming one of the commercial wings of the Walloon battle. Like the small independent businessmen, who really perceive what there is in their fiscal situation, for example, that is unjust compared to that of their Flemish colleagues. These are not, a priori, people who vote Socialist. But stories like Pegard's are also likely to raise Walloons to a greater regional consciousness.

Is There Solidarity Among Miners?

[Question] But as a Socialist, don't you feel any solidarity with the workers in the Campine coalmines?

[Answer] Did they have solidarity with the Cokerill-Sambre steelworkers that were deprived of their jobs? Sentimentally, obviously I feel close to the miners, but politically, when I see Vanden Brande today resuming his tirade on

behalf of the national sectors, and when I hear Deprez and Michel say again what they shouted in vain at that time, I say to myself, Vanden Brande will win again this time!

[Question] Certain well-known personalities somewhat on the fringe of Christian trade-union circles have just joined the PS. Do you think you can go farther in raking through the Christian family?

[Answer] I was struck, for example, by the tone of what Robert Dhondt said in LE SOIR. The government has gone too far, too far, and I believe that in the Christian unions they are increasingly convinced of the necessity of becoming radicalized. Obviously, we must not underestimate the recuperative capacity of the PSC [Christian Social Party]; that party is like a boxer who is incapable of giving his opponent a knockout punch but, after exhausting him, gets his knockout. And the time has come for true democrats to mobilize and, especially, not to fall back into the trap of the education war the right is handing them.

[Question] On the francophone side there are very few politicians who find favor in your eyes.

[Answer] I was very satisfied to hear Jean Gol take a position on Brussels. It is absolutely necessary for us francophones to get together on this point so we can confront the Flemings together. Even Gerard Deprez will have to be convinced of that. At the last minute, as always.

Van Miert Leaves Group

Brussels LE SOIR in French 26 Sep 84 p 2

[Article by J.v.S.: "Van Miert Leaves the European Socialist Group"]

[Text] Jose Happart's going over to the PS still makes people grit their teeth here and there. In the PSC, Gerard Deprez had very hard words in criticism of a francophone Socialist strategy that risks "leaving Wallonia with nothing but the status of an Indian reservation." On that occasion, Mr Deprez renewed the suggestion he made in these columns to the francophone political leaders, that they learn Dutch. And in order that things should be clear, the president of the PSC added, "I refuse to enter into the spiral of electoral bidding that Guy Spitaels has set in motion on the subject of communities, his only goal being to avoid presenting any serious suggestions in the economic and social area."

But in fact it was Karel Van Miert who created the surprise. The SP president, who is also vice president of the Union of Socialist Parties of the European Community, decided to leave the European Assembly's socialist group, while asking his peers to let him keep an administrative and technical tie with the group.

On the leder zijn waarheid ["To each his truth"] broadcast Sunday on the BRT [Dutch-language Belgian Radio and Television], Karel Van Miert already raised all the doubts as to his intentions. Skipping an additional step in the verbal escalation, the SP president sent a letter to the president of the Socialist Group of the European Parliament, the German Rudi Arndt. In it he said he deplored the fact that the group's bylaws do not provide for any recourse against admitting an officially elected member of a Socialist Party.

Megalomaniacal Frustrations

"Officially, there seems to be no means of defense against persons who make themselves members of a Socialist Party for purely opportunistic reasons. to obtain in that manner access to the Socialist Group, which would undoubtedly have been impossible for them formerly. With many other Group members, I deplore the fact that our bylaws cannot prevent these practices, which are unwholesome and disastrous for our political credibility. It is in fact clearly apparent that a large majority of the Group would like not to see in its midst this phenomenon of the national Poujadism that Happart represents. They are aware that in this case they are dealing with a person who once characterized himself as being as unstable as nitroglycerine. Happart is only interested in the use, and especially the abuse of the Group to promote his nationalistic extremism and his megalomaniacal frustrations. They know that Happart, by his actions, is making even more difficult, if not totally impossible, the solving of Belgium's problems, which are delicate and complex. They know that his action is determined by his hatred of the Flemings, including Flemish Socialists. They know that Happart's entrance into the Group by breaking and entering makes it nearly impossible from now on to have an exemplary collaboration between SP and PS elected representatives, which has always existed within the Group. How a brother party could let itself be dragged along by Happart and company into these ultra-nationalistic waters remains an enigma to us."

Karel Van Miert again points out that his three fellow candidates will follow his example; there is no question of sitting on the same benches as a "political burglar."

What all these events amount to is that Karel Van Miert has carelessly placed himself with his back against the wall. Because he had the support of the "German bloc" in the European Socialist Group, he thought he keep access to the socialist paradise away from Jose Happart, forgetting that the burgomaster of Fouron was holding a major asset in reserve: to belong to the PS is to be a member of the Socialist Internationale and the Union of Socialist Parties of the European Community.

What it also amounts to is that Karel Van Miert, the undisputed winner in last European election in Flanders, is above all afraid that just a geographical proximity to Jose Happart will furnish polemical arguments to his north-country rivals within a year of the next legislative elections.

LOSS OF 'SECOND VOTE' SUPPORTERS SERIOUS THREAT TO FDP

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 30 Aug 84 p 10

[Article by Prof Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann: "Don't Depend on Second Voters"]

[Text] "The next Bundestag election in 1987 is still a long way off and no one can tell exactly what will happen--but what do you think? Do you feel that the FDP will regain its seats in the next Bundestag election or do you believe that the FDP will not receive enough votes to remain?" This is a question from the Allensbach survey in July 1984. Almost half, 47 percent of those questioned answered, "will not receive enough votes." Only a minority of 24 percent believed that the FDP would pull it off again in 1987. That is something to think about. Just a few weeks ago on 17 July, though, the FDP had received only 4.8 percent of the votes in the European Parliament election, that is, in a situation without second votes. So you do not have to be particularly daring to predict that in a Bundestag election involving second votes that the FDP could receive more than 5 percent of the votes.

This is even more the case if you analyze the results of the European Parliament election in closer detail. According to an Allensbach survey taken in July, the FDP is no longer represented in the European Parliament due to the fact that one in every 4 FDP members did not vote for the FDP but for the CDU/CSU. FDP voters have left their party and Union voters have not stepped into the breach. FDP voters were more solid in their voting for the CDU/CSU than members of any other party. When questioned about their party's chances in the 1987 Bundestag election, almost a third of the FDP voters were doubtful that the FDP would bring it off again. The Union voters are divided into three almost equally strong camps. They will pull it off, they will not pull it off, undecided. The Allensbach surveys which examined voter preferences separately according to first and list votes have thus shown that the FDP clearly had more than 5 percent--mostly between 6 and 7 percent--of the list votes since June 1983. That is almost the same amount as in the 1983 Bundestag election in March.

It is clear that the FDP will not be able to cross the 5 percent hurdle with its core voters. But that is nothing new. The same thing happened during the SPD/FDP coalition. It is also nothing out of the blue that many FDP politicians hesitate to take on the role of the FDP in the party system of the Federal Republic. Throughout the past 10 years, you could track the

simultaneous swelling of the FDP ranks and the thinning of the SPD ranks and vice versa--the thinning of FDP ranks at the same time the ranks of the SPD were swelling. The electors used the freedom to move back and forth between the two coalition parties so as to air their grievances, especially their displeasure over the people's party, the SPD. The FDP acted as the vent and thus it stabilized democracy.

FDP politicians have quite a different ideal in mind: the ideal of the "function party" as we know it from the party system of the Weimar Republic. It is a small party that is large enough to gain majorities and, as a reward, carries out specific objectives. In order to fulfill such a role today, the FDP is continually looking for "political issues to engage in." But to accomplish that you need a sufficient number of core voters, at least 70 percent of one's members. However, less than 60 percent (usually only 40 or 50 percent) of the FDP electorate constitute core party voters.

What kind of voters are these? The ones who plan to cast their list vote but not their first for the FDP. The ones to whom FDP policies must be directed. They certainly are not pure "liberals." When asked to describe themselves, 69 percent of those voters planning to cast their first and list votes for the FDP said they were "liberals." Of those who were only going to cast their list votes for the FDP, only 28 percent considered themselves "liberals." Three out of every four voters planning to cast their list vote for the FDP are presently Union sympathizers. So the absolutely necessary additional list votes cannot be won from the ranks of the SPD supporters and of the Green party. These list votes can also not be won through the use of topical issues and positions that are embraced especially by the SPD or that could be borrowed from the Green party's stockpile. For the FDP the situation is still the same as it has been since the summer of 1981, even though this fact has already been long forgotten. Since the summer of 1981 and continuing rapidly until the autumn of 1982, the SPD and the FDP both lost members to the point that the Social Democrats could no longer acquire any new members from the FDP and the FDP could no longer win new members from the ranks of the SPD. For this reason the ranks of the Union party grew to 58 percent up until September of 1982. It is only from this reserve that the FDP could hope to gain new members for itself. An interesting question: Could the Green party ever have become a well-founded third party if, at that time, the FDP had decided on the change in coalition earlier. As things stood in 1981/82, the only party the dissatisfied liberal young adults could turn to was the Greens.

Not long ago in a keynote address, Bangemann, the Minister of Economics, said that the present goal is first to stabilize the coalition and secondly to create a "visible position" for the FDP in the coalition. If the FDP seeks this position by constituting the mouthpiece of political positions within the coalition which the SPD and the Greens already represent, then it will not stabilize the coalition and no list voters will be drawn from the reserve of Union members. The FDP cannot seek "independence" from the ranks of the opposition. In view of its potential list voters, the FDP must present a clear position on those issues on which the CDU/CSU members find their home party not clear and decisive enough.

Many FDP politicians fear that they must present the party as a "pure economic party" so as to woo the list voters from the CSU/CDU. That is, they would have to represent the theory of social market economy as closely as possible. But that is not the case. The independents and prominent supporters of the market economy would already be casting their first and list votes for the FDP, if they decided on the FDP at all. The loosely connected list voters are more senior salaried employees and civil servants, younger than the core rank and file. They are naturally not under 30, since the FDP has lost those young supporters probably for some time to come to a large degree to the Green party. But they represent heavily the age group between 30 and 60. They are more strongly supportive of international security (e.g., for NATO and for adequate armament) and for domestic security (for instance, ban on concealment). They support a stable economy, good money management of the public budget, debureaucratization. Are the list voters with whom the FDP must concern itself those former members of the "right" it thought it had lost? There are some signs for this: 24 percent describe themselves as "conservative" as compared to only 12 percent of the FDP's core rank and file; and their strong national commitment is clear.

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CSO: 3620/468

ADLER EXAMINES RECENT SOVIET POWER SHIFTS

Paris LIBERATION in French 14 Sep 84 p 26

[Article by Alexandre Adler: "The Defeat of Andropov's Friends"]

[Text] The dismissal of Marshal Ogarkov, the cancellation of visits by the Bulgarian and East German heads of state to the FRG, at least a verbal rekindling of animosities with the United States, the extremely provisional return of Chernenko to Moscow: all of this presents an entirely coherent ensemble of actions which are all hurting the Soviet leadership at once.

In the presence of such an accumulation, one is led first to a conclusion that is purely formal in nature: after a period of confusion fostered in particular by the exceptional summer-long radio silence of Chernenko, which could only give rise to all kinds of speculation on the instability and precariousness of the administration, a majority that is perhaps a new phenomenon has come to the fore at the political bureau, to ensure the recovery of power, inasmuch as the crucial episode had occurred during the week following the meeting of the administrative body on 6 September.

As to the announcement by various Soviet sources that Marshal Ogarkov's removal from office brought on his cardiac disturbance--nothing very new in that: on the other hand, it is absolutely false that failing health can bring about an immediate putting out to pasture. Moreover, this was never the case with two of his colleagues, Marshals Malinovsky and Grechko, who are far more sickly. One can therefore assume that this rumor is a current part of the red-herring campaign being conducted by the Soviet authorities. In reality, if Ogarkov's heart attack dates from the period between 1 and 3 September, it is that it is simultaneous with the cancellation of the Honecker trip and with other measures taken, which doubtless constitute a veritable decree (obligatory instruction session for the entire administrative group). In attempting to interpret this decree of 6 September, we have at our disposition several verifiable facts among a large number of hypothetical elements: in this battle, the direct heirs of Andropov are the great losers.

The Blows Begin To Rain Down

Indeed, the accession of Chernenko in February 1984 most brutally interrupted the development of his predecessor's strategy. From the very first

weeks of the new regime the blows began to rain down: blame cast on the organization of the Moscow district of which Andropov had been the representative, deprivation of Soviet citizenship for Yuriy Lyubimov, Andropov's protege, postponement of the bestowal of the Order of Lenin for the death-dealing pilot who destroyed the KAL [Korean Airlines] Boeing, 3 months after the campaign begun by the high military authorities against the decision to bring down the aircraft. Here we must recall that Ogarkov, by placing the responsibility for the destruction of the Boeing on the Far East regional command, had by that very fact refused to cover up the act itself; subsequently, the publication of an article in the monthly called SOVIET AVIATION exalting the sacrifice of a pilot who had been killed while trying to force a foreign civilian aircraft to land, had as its purpose to reopen the file on the affair: it is likely that the military leadership of the time, therefore Ogarkov, had approved the article. It is certain that Chernenko, the proud border guard of Turkestan, decided to close the affair immediately, to the honor of those who had decided to shoot. That is what used to be called in China a reversal of verdicts.

In foreign policy we soon witnessed a similar turnabout in the case of China (cancellation without forewarning of the visit of Arkhipov), therefore of India (sale of sophisticated materiel), and of the West (cancellation of participation in the Olympic Games). Finally, the Academy of Sciences was humiliated in the person of Sakharov, the scheduled industrial reforms were intentionally slowed down, the Brezhnev family was very officially rehabilitated, and--as a last esthetic touch to the painting--the 90-year-old Molotov was warmly reintegrated into the party a year after Andropov and Ogarkov had begun to speak again of a series of anti-Stalinist personalities, from Tukhashevskiy to Khrushchev.

The Followers of Andropov Counterattack

After bending under the shock, the friends of Andropov tried to respond to the offensive with the weapons they had at their disposal, that is the four decisionmaking centers still under their control: the general military staff (Ogarkov), the KGB and the minister of the interior (Chebrikov-Fedorchuk), a part of the government machinery (Vorotnikov-Aliyev), and especially the peripheral allies (Honecker, Jaruzelski, Kadar and the new Bulgarian administrators of the younger generation).

It was these four sources which transmitted the "bugs" in the Chernenko line that became progressively more audible and clear.

--The KGB: heartfelt praise of Andropov by Chebrikov, in contrast with his colleagues during the "electoral campaign," the consolidation of the KGB/army alliance on the occasion of Chernenkov's promotion to the rank of army general (and not to that of marshal, as dispatches from the agency had announced), then the recent resumption of the anticorruption campaign, notably in Uzbekistan, under Aliyev's instigation.

--The Andropovians in the government: newspaper articles contradicting the general party line in various issues of IZVESTIYA as well as in the

SOVIETSKAYA ROSSIYA, amounting to official support for Honecker (Tolkunov), a continuation of the campaign in favor of the reforms in specialized reviews (for example: Ambartsumov in PARTY LIFE). Matters reached a pause with the article of the Novosibirsk academician Abel Aganbegyan, who, in the union daily TRUD, denounced the total blockage of reforms since the death of Andropov and advocated the immediate implementation of marketing practices on the Hungarian model (end of August).

--The highly placed military officers Ogarkov and Tolubko (strategic forces) brought up again for their part the line of argument presented by their minister Ustinov, dealing as much with the strategic importance of the Pershing missiles as with the orientation of the defense industries. There, too, the ultimate extent of the offensive begun in the spring was attained at the end of August, while anticorruption campaigns were once again coming under discussion.

--Finally, Andropov's associates within the socialist camp, who are not bound by the majority decisions of the Soviet party themselves, are encouraged to pursue their cause despite the launching of a vast "anti-autonomist" campaign, of which Gromyko is the leader. The latter includes several themes bound one to the other, and which lead to a frontal criticism of Andropov's strategy: the refusal of any rapprochement whatever with China (article of Ponomarev's assistant, Boris Rakhmanin, the polemic of Vietnam against the GDR), the rejection of economic reforms which are leading to an exorbitant opening on the world market (polemic of RUDE PRAVO against Hungary and quite recently the hammering sustained by the GDR in the Soviet press, after Honecker had claimed for himself a large majority at the political bureau of the SED [Socialist Unity Party of Germany (GDR)]), and finally the refusal to establish within the Western world any distinction whatsoever between Europeans and Japanese on the one hand and Americans on the other. Was not Gromyko, with a very peculiar sense of humor, to go so far as to allude to the fate of Pompei in the presence of the Italian minister, Andreotti, and--it is now common knowledge--to reprove Chernenko, who in his senile confusion had just accepted an invitation from Genscher?

Hungarians, East Germany and even Bulgarians have held true to their foreign policy; no doubt the Bulgarians, anxious about their international image since the attempted assassination of the pope, were desirous of improving their relations with the West, even at the risk of displeasing Chernenko. Moreover, their administration, profoundly reshaped shortly before the death of Andropov, doubtless now bears the imprint of current reformers who are close to the USSR. The Chinese themselves, while personally implicating Chernenko, have strictly held back up to now from questioning Soviet politics as an entity, trusting in the possible evolution of the summit battle in Moscow. Coming at the end of August, the very brutal removal from office of Tsedenbal, the Mongol head of state, most certainly represented a serious failure for Chernenko, as well as a probable overture toward Beijing. This is the ultimate attainment of the counteroffensive of the partisans of the deceased Andropov.

The Return of Chernenko

Between 25 August and 6 September a stop to the neo-Andropovian counteroffensive was observed to have taken place, focused on the ephemeral return of Chernenko to Moscow. This is a certainty. The nature of the coalition that joined forces for this purpose is much more hypothetical: one gets the feeling that Chernenko profited very little personally from the in-principle victory of his arguments. The latest indiscretions coming from Moscow insist on his poor health: even if his allies have once again retrieved his outlay, this has not visibly strengthened his prestige. Chernenko is tolerated but certainly not exalted, as would suit a secretary-general who is also the head of state. That is the reason why we may be permitted to believe that on the occasion of the defeat of Ogarkov and his followers, it was decided to retrieve the outlay of a Chernenko, caught in a precarious position, in exchange for important compensations, which is still a bit early to estimate.

(Tomorrow the sequel: the crisis of the Soviet bloc)

8117

CSO: 3519/511

ANALYSIS OF RALITE, FITERMAN, LE PORS, RIGOUT PARTY ROLE

Paris LIBERATION in French 4 Jul 84 p 7

[Article by Eric Dupin: "The Four Cardinal Points of the Party"]

[Text] Postponement until the early fall. After the hullabaloo of these recent days, the protagonists in the internal debate which is agitating the PCF [French Communist Party] seem determined to observe a summer truce. Each of them is still suffering the effects of the unprecedented crisis which has erupted within the party. Georges Marchais decided to go to Romania on vacation, and the communist ministers have sealed their lips. Marcel Rigout, for example, has just announced he will not participate after all in the "Before the Public" broadcast scheduled for 9 July on France-Inter.

The attitude adopted by the four communist ministers is, moreover, indicative of the range of opinions coexisting within their party. The center of gravity for those who represent the PCF in the cabinet has indeed shifted perceptibly toward the "renovation" faction. But this group of four is not really a cohesive unit. Not only is the "conservative" Jack Ralite at the opposite extreme from the "renovator" Marcel Rigout, but Charles Fiterman and Anicet Le Pors are situated at still other points on the political map of the PCF. This diversity clearly shows that if the internal debate has crystallized two extremes (the "renovation" versus "conservative" duality), it is not taking the form of a confrontation of two consistent camps.

Jack Ralite--Conservative Apparatchik

This is the communist minister whose government activities have been the least brilliant. He went from problems in the Health Ministry to a position in Labor which is at the least uncomfortable. He is also the only communist minister who has kept quiet since 17 June. It is true that in comparison to his three party colleagues in the government, Jack Ralite is the man whose professional career has depended most on the party. A municipal employee in a communist commune at the beginning, he soon became a journalist for L'HUMANITE and L'HUMANITE-DIMANCHE before becoming deputy mayor of Aubervilliers (1965) and then a deputy representing Seine-Saint-Denis (1973). A whole lifetime in the seraglio for a man who has been a member of the PCF since 1947.

His party discipline is the stronger since he has never played a leading role in the apparatus. Ralite did not become a member of the Central Committee

until 1979. He has long been affiliated with Roland Leroy, and he stood out in December of 1981 as the only communist minister who did not distance himself from the support given to General Jaruzelski's putsch by the PCF.

With such a pedigree, one can understand that Ralite today has a confirmed "conservative" inclination. The appeal of which this veteran expert in the culture of the communist deputies' group is capable should be treated with caution. Ralite is only open in appearance.

Charles Fiterman--Ambitious Centrist

He too has kept silent. Until Sunday, when the Rigout bomb forced the transportation minister to give Marchais public assurance of its loyalty. His main concern is safeguarding his chance of succeeding the present secretary general. A former director of the Central Party School and a member of the Political Bureau since 1976, Fiterman is the only communist minister who really counts in the apparatus.

All of this makes it necessary for him to adhere to the party leadership. Thus it was that his clarification last Sunday included very harsh assessments of the government policy. Simultaneously, Fiterman wants to situate himself at the balance point in the internal PCF debate. Speaking before the Central Committee, he did not avoid questions on party strategy.

During this high-wire exercise, Fiterman made use of his formidable skill as a tactician, to the point that some communists are wondering if the most popular PCF leader is not holding strategic reasoning in reserve. Whatever the case, Fiterman does not want to mortgage his future by plunging into an internal debate.

Anicet Le Pors--Open Intellectual

He is the only communist minister whose career has developed outside the party. Anicet Le Pors was not completely integrated in the apparatus until 1977, when he became a senator. He is also the individual who joined the party latest--at the age of 27. Le Pors is not a real product of the apparatus. This working intellectual, who went from meteorology to economic analysis, is a marginal figure in the communist world. He knows how to profit from this separate status to say what he has to say. This is what he did after 17 June, appealing to his party for a "leap" and an analysis in depth of the reasons for the communist decline.

A member of the renovation faction by conviction, Le Pors is not however an advocate of the great upset. Above all, he is aware that it would be hardly desirable for an intellectual such as himself to adopt positions which are too drastic in the discussion agitating the PCF. Caution.

Marcel Rigout--Dyed-in-the-Wool Renovator

The most ardent "renovator" among the communist ministers is also the individual who joined the party earliest (in 1944, at the age of 16) and the

Central Committee member with the greatest seniority (1961). Solidly established in his native Haute-Vienne, Rigout is also the man who can make best use of proletarian experience. He has been a farm worker, a construction worker and then a lathe worker.

Born on 10 May 1928, this man of the land is one of those whose roots have not been cut off by the logic of the apparatus. Bound by no ambition, conscious of having reached the summit of his political career as a minister, Rigout has no fear of appearing to be a fanatical "renovator." He has nothing to lose by urging his comrades, from the heights of his undeniable experience, to undertake a veritable "cultural revolution." In doing so, he is voicing out loud what is felt by a certain number of elected communist officials and party leaders aware of their party's terrible loss of prestige.

A comparison of the individual and political profiles of the four communist ministers leads to a paradox which is rather upsetting from the point of view of Colonel-Fabien. It is the man who best corresponds to the communist myth (a former worker who joined the party in his adolescence, and during the Resistance) who most ardently desires to shake the palm tree.

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CSO: 3519/417

GOVERNMENTAL CAREER ACHIEVEMENTS OF PSF MEMBERS REVEALED

Paris LIBERATION in French 4 Jul 84 pp 12-14

[Article by Monique Dagnaud and Domonique Mehl: "Cabinet Staff--The Rose Diaspora"]

[Text] Three years after the left-wing took office, and 2 years after the survey they made of cabinet ministers' staffs, the authors of "The Rose Elite" (Ramsay) took to the field again. They located all of the individuals who served on the general staffs of the ministers in the course of the first year of the 7-year term. More than half have departed to serve in other posts in government and parapublic administrations, in a phenomenon of movement and advancement through politics consistent with the institutional logic. In this realm, the left wing has invented nothing new, either in one direction or the other. As under all preceding governments, the best passport to the highest rungs on the social podium is education in general and at the ENA [National School of Administration] in particular.

Less than 4 years after graduation from the ENA, Yvon Robert has just been propelled to the head of the teaching personnel office of the Ministry of Education. A teacher converted to administrative work, he moved through the budget bureau of this ministry with the speed of a comet. Plucked from there by the left wing, this lively militant was a member of the staff of Alain Savary in May of 1981, unofficially because of his limited experience. With a year's service, barely 3 in the cabinet, this superboss of the teachers is only 34.

Several months at the side of Catherine Lalumiere sufficed to launch Christiane Dore. She devoted herself body and soul to consumers, to the PS [Socialist Party] and to [rest of sentence garbled].

Remy Pautrat planned to spend a peaceful life in a provincial subprefecture. And here he is at 44, at the summit of his career, appointed prefect of Hautes-Alpes. This rise, exceptional for one who failed in the internal ENA competition, owes much to his stay on Claude Cheysson's team. A childhood worthy of Zola, exhausting study, several laborious years in the tax inspection department, and finally integration at the end in the prefectural body.

In short, a scholarship student successful by dint of sheer effort, and finally catapulted to the top level by the left wing.

These are some of the golden branches singled out in the rose elite for services rendered in the corridors of power. Let us return to earth: the elevators also stop halfway! Are the cabinet staffs professional springboards? Indeed, but one cannot suddenly do away with the supreme distinction: fate does not smile in the same way on the favorites and outsiders.

In the outposts of the cabinet staffs there are few vanguard leaders in the break with capitalism, few bearded worthies produced by the secular clubs. The first to be eliminated from the socialist baggage were the ENA graduates and the members of the prestigious state bodies--the few aristocrats in government posts who had flirted with the left or who at least had not taken after the right wing sufficiently boldly. For this administrative elite, the detour through a cabinet staff post was a baptism of fire confirming the pretenders on their career paths. The political sages on the Rue Saint-Guillaume have provided a flood of proof on this subject. That these graduates bound lightly toward the peaks after the ritual stay in the shadow of a minister is but proof that they are destined for a brilliant future.

Today two-thirds of the members of this finest flower have taken flight to posts as high-ranking dignitaries. This administrative elite has landed on sparkling perches: 66 posts at the head of departments or large enterprises have changed hands. There is no reason, however, for excessive indignation. No one (in the know) will be surprised that Roland Morin, 52, advisory clerk to the Accounting Court, and with 10 years' service on the staff of the DGRST [General Delegation for Scientific and Technical Research], has been named general director for research, after having headed a team working with Jean-Pierre Chevenement. Or that the finance inspector, Robert Lion, 50, who has long held top posts in the administration, has become the head of the Deposit and Consignment Office, after having directed the Matignon team. More generally, the cabinet tour has led to a grade promotion for various members of the elite who were already on the track for the honors race.

Certain assignments, moreover, are indicative. Meshing with the socialist engine, some high officials were incorporated in the first formula for professional advancement. Eight "striplings" now head superdepartments. Eric Giuily, head of the Mendes-France graduating class at the ENA (1978) leapt from the staff of the interior minister to the department in charge of local collectives. Elisabeth Bukspan, 35, the first female finance inspector, was promoted to general director of the ACTIM [Technical, Industrial and Economic Cooperation Agency], after having given Michel Jobert, and then Edith Cresson, the benefit of her brilliance. Her classmate in the Leon Blum graduating class at the ENA, Martine Aubry, the young civil administrator of labor at the age of 34 (the right arm of Jean Auroux and later Pierre Berezogovoy), has been appointed to head the Labor Relations Office, a binding family tradition for the daughter of Jacques Delors. Jean-Marc Sauve, 35, a former militant in the CFDT [French Democratic Confederation of Labor] at the ENA, and fresh from the Council of State, went from the staff of Robert Badinter to the General Administration and Equipment Office at the Ministry of Justice.

Bernard Gaudilliere, who left the ENA as civil finance administrator, joined the PS in 1982. This premonitory choice will facilitate his integration in the cabinet, following Henri Emmanuelli from the DOM-TOM [Overseas Departments and Territories] to Budget, prior to taking charge of Customs. At 34, he supervises 22,000 agents. Gilles Bellec, 35, and Philippe Lorino, 34, both mining corps engineers, are regenerating the leadership in Industry. The former, after a tour of duty on the staff of the Minister of Energy, was appointed to head the DIGEC [Gas, Electricity and Coal Office], and then the DHYCA [Hydrocarbons Office]. The latter, who was a technical adviser to Pierre Dreyfus and Jean-Pierre Chevenement, has been appointed assistant to the director general for Industry. Where Yvon Robert is concerned, we have already seen the meteoric advancement he has enjoyed.

Other ENA graduates who were pursuing peaceful careers in the civil service omnibus have leapt on the bandwagon of success. Let us have a peek at some of these fine appointments. Yvon Ollivier was made a prefect at the age of 40 (thanks to Defferre). What could be better? Diplomat Bernard Miyet has joined the administration of the SOFIRAD (thanks to Fillioud). And again, Patrick Careil, 36, a finance inspector, has hoisted himself to the head of the tax legislation department at Budget (thanks to Fabius). And the highest honor: Jean Peyrelevade, a polytech graduate who had navigated between Planning and the Credit Lyonnais, has reached the peak at the Bank of Suez (thanks to Mauroy).

A small battalion of teachers, a heavy contingent of professional politicians, and a few middle-level civil servants have slipped into the corridors of power. Their tours of duty on cabinet staffs put them in the saddle for the race for posts from which they would have a priori been excluded. Not all of the outsiders placed, but some of them did. For them, politics works marvelously as a lever for an unexpected transfer or promotion.

In the front ranks are the university pilgrims. They had reached the cabinet staff level, already winded by their professorial dedication. Their routes often combined weariness with and flight from teaching, or compensation through political commitment. For about a quarter of them, the pilgrimage to a cabinet staff put the final stamp on their divorce from their students.

The teachers, basically, came out well. The Council of State offered some temporary posts--for Jean-Francois Dubos after his stay with Charles Hernu, and to Maurice Benassayag, after his apprenticeship with the Secretariat of State for Repatriated Persons. Some succeeded in bold leaps: Jean-Herve Lorenzi became economic adviser to the director of Telecommunications, after serving Jean-Pierre Cot, first, and then Jean-Pierre Chevenement, and Bernard Toulemonde left Matignon for the Ministry of National Education, where he was appointed to head the General Affairs Office.

Researchers are also gaining heights along the path toward the highest state posts. Jean de Kervasdoue, after a lightning passage through the Matignon Palace, heads the Hospital Office. Jacques Bombal, an adviser to Edith Cresson in Agriculture, has been appointed director of farm and food industries. Away from the bosom of the state, some have found their destiny in

banking, such as Francois Soulage, a former member of Michel Rocard's staff in Planning, who will henceforth head the Institute for the Development of the Social Economy (IDES). The embassies provide a last recourse for some teachers in need of a point of fall. It is whispered that Michel de la Fourniere, a history professor but above all the number one man in the Rocard faction, will soon be appointed cultural attache in Algiers. He was a member of Jean-Pierre Cot's brain trust.

For the regular officials of the parties, trade unions and associations, escape is not so simple. Of these, 61 percent are still snug in their ministries today, with a handful moving from staff to staff pending a stable assignment. However, like Cinderella some of them have pursued the glass slipper under the protective eye of a minister. A few spectacular appointments nurture the fantasies of this small world of activists.

Patrick Weil, the youngest son of the rose elite, served as assistant to Francois Autain after a flashy career in the PS: at the age of 22, he was installed in the leadership committee at the Congress of Metz. He succeeded in securing a post in the administrative machinery, where he will henceforth serve as deputy representative in the PME [small and medium-sized businesses] department at the Ministry of Industry. Danielle Bahisson, the faithful assistant of Yvette Roudy, has miraculously come to rest at the French Foreign Trade Center. Marielle Boutonnat, carried off from her job with the Forum of Les Halles, is supervising the Higher Council on Sex Education and the Family. Another lifebuoy has been entry into a state body through a foreign tour. The Council of State, again, opened its doors to Rene Bidouze, a CGT [General Confederation of Labor] enthusiast in the entourage of Anicet Le Pors, to Robert Cheramy, an FEN [National Education Federation] leader serving in the Elysee Palace, and to Rene Decaillon, a CDT member recruited by Jean Auroux. The prefectural body recruited Raymond Vergnes, a former civil servant in the parliament assigned to the staff of Roger Quilliot, Claude Bodin, on his departure from the PTT [Postal and Telecommunications Administration] staff, and also Gilles Bardou, a former assistant of Pierre Mauroy in the north, who later served Jean Le Garrec.

Unless given a push, the middle-level civil servants have very little chance of reaching the summit. Politics, and that alone, unlocks certain doors. Also, staff experience sometimes opens a little side gate for middle-level civil servants, and the happy few chosen pass through. Olivier Marec became communications director at the Ministry of Industry after a lightning tour with Laurent Fabius: he was the developer of the Marne-la-Vallee public establishment. Jean-Paul Olivier had a peaceful post in Commerce and Small Business. He was appointed assistant director at the Ministry of Consumer Affairs, after serving on the staff of Andre Delelis. Alain Bechtel is secretary general of the AEC [Atomic Energy Commission]-Industry. He was a team leader at Gas of France before joining the staff of Pierre Dreyfus. In their footsteps, a fifth of the middle-level civil servants who have served on a cabinet staff thus succeed in escaping their mediocre fate. It is true that one lends most readily to the rich, but slim purses can double their stake as well.

Little Red Riding Hood has met the industrial fairy. More than any other, the ministry on Rue de Grenelle is a haven of partiality for the socialist elite. Twenty-four fresh graduates of the cabinet staffs are scattered throughout this administration, which has been merged with that in charge of research.

Jean-Pierre Chevenement has made his lordly departure, and he did not take his men down with him. Louis Gallois, his staff director, civil administrator of finance, set siege to a private preserve of Mines, the General Industry Office.

One of his advisers, Pierre Papon, is well-situated in the CNRS [National Center for Scientific Research]. Another, Bruno Gazeau, who was jointly in charge of a political branch in Belfort, has a slot with the DIMME [Metallurgical, Mechanical and Electrical Industries Office]. And so on.... Greedy, this administration, which glowed with the socialist eruption, also pumped up team talent from the well of other ministerial staffs.

A similar influx can be seen in the public and national enterprises (although these empires are far from having been colonized by these newcomers). The SNCF [French National Railroads], Havas, Sacilor, the Credit National, the Bank of Suez, the BNP [National Bank of Paris] and the Credit Lyonnais have welcomed the leading elite inspired (?), educated (?), and tested (?) by a sojourn on socialist earth. If only one single case of promotion which made the employers' world shudder need be mentioned, let us proceed. Loik Le Floch, director of the office staff of Pierre Dreyfus, had had a high-quality career in the management of research, after laboring hard in the United States. Today he is at the controls of Rhone Poulenc, in charge of 70,000 wage-earners. A member of the PS since Epinay, he enjoys the rock-solid confidence of the government leaders. As head of the task force on industrial problems with the DGRST, he was not entirely a novice. His staff colleague at the Industrie Michel Vaquin (X-Ponts, Harvard, former adviser to Raymond Barre), is second in command of this fine flower of chemistry. This enthusiasm for the world of industry, however, stops at the gates of private businesses. Is this the innate instinct of an elite which has always professed its faith in the virtues of public authority, and which, whether serving the right or the left wing, rarely accepts nongovernmental employment in groups not controlled by the state? Or is it a question of a glacial welcome on the part of the leading employers left confused by the socialist schemes? The "rose peril" has hardly destroyed the stability of the industrial and financial establishment. The few jobs allocated to graduates of the cabinet staffs are sometimes spectacular (public relations, radio) but they do not confer the essence of power.

With one exception, that of Alain Madec, now the second in command at Roussel-Uclaf. This young inspector, who had just finished his education at Finance when he was appointed by Pierre Dreyfus, was not however put in orbit by a minister. He refused to continue staff work after the arrival of Jean-Pierre Chevenement, but put in a year with the National Coal Board before being appointed to the management of the pharmaceutical giant. His fine technical skill had been noted during his staff tour.

The top of the prize list goes without question to the Matignon Palace. It is a little harder to leave the building on the Rue de Varenne than the other ministerial premises, but when one leaves, it is with the head held high. In the distribution of prizes, there are a few passports to higher administration. For example, Henri Guillaume was given command of the General Planning Commissariat. Above all, Pierre Mauroy's advisers have mounted an attack on the public and newly nationalized enterprises: a third of those who have departed are to be found there. At the table of honor are Andre Chadeau, president of the SNCF; Jean Saint-Geours, director of Credit National; not to overlook Jean Peyrelevade and Robert Lion, who as we have seen have taken charge of the Suez Financial Company and the Deposit and Consignment Office, respectively; and Jean Deflassieux, who for his part was already on the staff of the Credit Lyonnais, and who now heads it.

The Elysee Palace, in contrast, shows remarkable stability. A few advisers are enjoying a golden retirement to the Council of State (Francois-Xavier Stasse) or the Constitutional Council (Paul Legatte). However, with the exception of the noted departures of Andre Rousselet for Havas and Paul Guimard for the top Television Administration, the bonds hold fast. Is it a question of serenity or lack of awareness?

Let us not forget that they enjoy 2 years of calm more than their colleagues, since the Office of the Presidency will not face the electoral storm until 1988. The major ministries monopolized the first-prize winners. The Ministries of Economy, Foreign Trade (Michel Jobert era), Defense, Interior and Agriculture (in the days of Edith Cresson) choose well. The staffs of these cabinets have supplied the departments they sponsor with many directors or assistant directors. The members of the staff of Pierre Dreyfus have also experienced high-level fates. Jack Lang is noted for a keen instinct in regrouping his flock. Andre Larquie presently heads the Paris Opera, Claude Mollard is in charge of plastic arts at the ministry, Robert Abirached is in charge of theater and Dominique Wallon of decentralization.

In the command platoon, Jean-Pierre Chevenement, as we have seen, proved a virtuoso performer in assignment. His political colleague Francois Autain has also known how to protect his disciples. The competitors in the Rocard faction, on the contrary, must content themselves with honorable mention or rewards for survival. The members of the staff of Jean-Pierre Cot have scattered to the four winds, without any spectacular appointments. The staff of Michel Rocard has so to speak moved bag and baggage from Planning to Agriculture.

The collapse of the second left does not conceal the triumph of the staunch, pure left wing. The communist wave has not washed over the administration. In the PCF [French Communist Party] cabinet staffs, only Denis Coton, head of Charles Fiterman's staff, Pierre Gaborit and Rene Bidouze, advisers to Anicet Le Pors, stand out. The first mentioned received an unexpected promotion to the head of an Industry department at the end of an unspectacular career in that same ministry, and then with Renault. Gaborit was appointed director for youth in the ministry of Edwige Avice, and finally, we have mentioned the welcome given the last mentioned by the Council of State.

After all, if the fate of the advisers of former minister Andre Henry, an issue for many in the militant world, worries you, you should know that they are surviving, despite the inglorious departure of their minister. Georges-Bernard Renouard is director of tourism at the ministry, and Max Salomon and Michel-Roland Charvot have found refuge at the head of the ANIT, a government tourist body.

After a careful assessment of professional careers prior to and after a sojourn on a cabinet staff, what do our calculations indicate? For about a quarter of the members of the rose elite, careers have undergone a dazzling swing. There are 69 happy men for whom the advent of the left wing really made the difference. And yet this happiness does not have the same sense for all: some expected it, promotions their due, while others did not--unexpected advancement.

The socialist wind gave a push to those who in any case had a reserved ticket for a deluxe cruise. The horizon cleared for some who, with a zephyr breeze from the right, would have navigated in deeper waters. Not a few were left on the dock. They will doubtless make up a waiting list, hoping to gain some other shore. As with social mobility, one's capital at the outset dictates the future. The cachet of ministerial staff service gives the well-endowed a push forward, and is sometimes a stroke of luck for those with limited or average assets, but it can also prove to be worth nothing. Such a venture should not in any case be confused with a makeup examination for ENA students who have failed. It is better to have planned one's future during the preparatory classes rather than 10 years later. Careerists only compete with others in a race in exceptional cases.

The attraction of the political career lies however in these occasional poker-type professional gambles. Then one can discard one's regrets at not having crammed at one's studies at the required time, and having preferred the Deligny swimming pool or the barricades to political science seminars.

Has the left wing discarded the rules of navigation in the waters of power? The verdict of the political science essays falls like a guillotine. In this game, the socialist world rewards its champions on the basis of the same performance as does the right wing. And with the same intensity, since under preceding governments, the test on a cabinet staff became a springboard for a career for only a third of the graduates.*

Professional Background of the Rose Elite

"The Rose Elite" indicated that in 1982, the make-up of the ministerial staffs were as follows:

Ten percent teachers, 15 percent political professionals (parties, trade unions, associations), 21 percent members of the administrative elite

* Rene Remond, Aline Coutrot and Isabel Boussard, "Forty Years of Cabinet Staffs," FNSP Press, 1982, p 117.

(top-level bodies and directoral posts), 44 percent high- and middle-level officials, and 10 percent intellectual professions and private cadres.

Of the total, 59 percent were members of the PS and 6 percent of the PCF.

Appointments by Original Profession
(in percentages)

Job on Leaving the Staff	State Body	High- Level Public Post	Middle- Level Public Post	Private Sector	Teaching	Politics	Total % and (N)
Original Profession							
Administrative elite	7	63	28	1	1	0	100 (121)
High-, middle-level posts	3	21	74	2	0	0	100 (58)
Intellectual professions and private cadres	4	32	32	32			
	4	32	32	32	0	0	100 (19)
Teaching, research	7	44	11	7	27	4	100 (27)
Professional politicians	19	24	24	8	0	25	100 (37)
Average % (N)	8 (21)	44 (115)	36 (95)	5 (13)	3 (8)	4 (10)	100 (262)

Extent of Departures by Original Profession
(in percentage of a total of 478 individuals)

	<u>Left Staff</u>	<u>Remained on Staff</u>
Administrative elite	65	35
Upper- and middle-level officials	58	42
Intellectual professions and private cadres	51	49
Teachers and researchers	54	46
Professional politicians	39	61
Average	56	44

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CSO: 3519/417

COMMENTS ON IMPORTANT ISSUES LOOMING AHEAD

Athens ENA in Greek 30 Aug 84 pp 12-13

[Text] "An event does not exist in isolation, and of course it does not fall from the sky. Behind it there is its gestation within political and social developments, and these shed a better light on it." This conclusion belongs to a famous history. But it is also of great value when applied to our current events, those which are filling the front pages of the newspapers.

It is the common conviction at last that the reader of the ENA is an informed reader. Perhaps the most informed. The reason is very simple: This periodical does not hide any information, does not keep silent about the activity of any party, and does not give prominence to or "protect" any. And this is because it is not protected by any, does not have any party ties.

On the eve of a heated political period and while only two days remain before the end of the summer holidays, the ENA is summarizing all of the information which exists on the great issues which will come into prominence in the coming months, so that the enlightened reader of this periodical can have in a concentrated form his own informational material and can form his own independent views.

The time for holding the elections, the electoral system, and the presidential selection of April 1985 will be the dominant issues next year. These are issues which have a mutual effect on each other, since the selection of the president is connected with the intention of A. Papandreou to have his party, and not the ND, the decisive political factor in the presidential election. He even wants the approval of K. Karamanlis by vote to seem to be a "voluntary offering" and not an obligatory move, as it is in fact. This objective of A. Papandreou is ensured either by the choosing of the president by the present Chamber of Deputies or by a new Chamber in which the ND will have less than 120 deputies. The reason is that A. Papandreou wants the "commanding majority" consisting of PASOK and the two communist parties to have 180 deputies, so that it will be in a position to have discussions on the vote for K. Karamanlis. But in order for this to take place, early elections are not enough. Also needed is an ingeniously devised and very distorted electoral law in order to give an edge to PASOK and its future allies.

Thus in regard to every earnest assurance either by the premier or by D. Maroudas that "the elections will take place in October 1985," the cautious reader has to read "between the lines" either that M. Koutsogiorgas has not managed to find the suitable electoral system, or that this system is not approved by K. Karamanlis, or that the reports which are reaching the government are not very optimistic as to the influence of PASOK.

If these "unsettled questions" are resolved, the most likely time for early elections will be first of all this autumn and after that next spring. Otherwise we go to June.

A shake-up--a "restructuring," in the government's language--will take place. This may involve either only A. Tritsis and V. Kedikoglou, or a greater number--some people are speaking about a two-figure number--of ministers, and some changes in the Council of Ministers are considered almost certain. In case the new arrivals are deputies, the reader should perceive in this the initial results of the recent vacations jointly taken at Kerkyra by A. Papandreou and G. Alevras. Namely, the strengthening of the power of the president of the Chamber of Deputies.

In the sector of the official opposition, the new leader will try to stamp the period of his own chairmanship with a new party image. Without a doubt his work will be difficult, not so much because of the inner-party reactions--those will slacken in the furnace of the electoral battle--as because of the deep surgical changes in the organization, ideology, and program of the party which had become imperative since immediately after the election defeat of 1981.

The relations between PASOK and the KKE will suggest more and more a marriage continuously agitated by infidelities, but things are not going to go as far as a divorce. This marriage will surely be helped also by the premier's trip to Moscow which will take place next spring.

In the economic sector, interest will be focused on the new 1985 income policy, which the reports expect will not be as plain-sailing as this year's policy. It is even very probable that when our bankers or G. Arsenis himself go abroad for borrowing in order to cover the deficits in the public sector, they will not find as obliging a response as they would like. But in that case the deficits (which, as the FNA revealed, have been enlarged by the debts of the distressed companies which have been nationalized) should be covered by way of new taxes.

Finally, the dollar will continue its upward course (the forecasts of the FNA were off by only 1 drachma!) up to the American presidential elections. Afterwards it will fall a fair amount with respect to the other European currencies. But the question is when precisely this will take place. As for the drachma, this will remain faithful to a broken promise on the part of PASOK. It will be "outside the EEC" in the sense that it may constitute the exception among the European currencies. Gains are not predicted for the drachma. On the contrary, a new devaluation is very likely.

On the national issues, certainly the Cyprus question will be dominant. The readers of the ENA were the first to be informed about the recent crisis, and the concern of everybody should be about the Turkish standpoint. The Turks will surely pass themselves off as more unyielding, and perhaps the non-acceptance of the proposal for the return of Famagusta will constitute yet another lost opportunity.

Gl. Kliridis is more likely to change his position than the leader of AKEL, E. Papaioannou. As for the latter, the most that one can expect is that he will not press his views.

In relations between our country and NATO, a follow-up to the visits of Weinberger, Rogers, and Carrington will have to be expected. Perhaps this follow-up is the idea of the "second line of defense" in the Aegean, which the alliance does not seem to be rejecting. But come what may, the new political period is occurring just prior to elections, and A. Papandreou takes delight in anti-Western outbursts. In any case the military officers are now hearing about the "detrimental effects of NATO," as the ENA has revealed. Finally, the attention of the reader will be focused once more on the weaponry of the Turkish armed forces. Again as the ENA has written, the objective of these weapons is unmistakable: the Aegean.

The EEC Course

But aside from the major political and national problems, concerning which ongoing processes have important developments in store for us, there were also other issues which were pinpointed in the recent past and which we expect will preoccupy us again in the future.

In the sector of the EEC and the European Parliament, after the "summer holidays" PASOK will begin again to escalate at home its propaganda in an anti-Community spirit, in order to be able to conjure this spirit up during election-campaign stumps in case of early elections. This policy will result in the resumption of arbitrary and perhaps anti-Community actions. But such actions defame our country internationally and, at the same time, diminish its negotiational authority within the "Big Ten." On the other hand, the government will fight in Brussels to obtain new Community financing, which it will use in the days before the elections without stating, as is its habit, the source of such money. And by the way, it did something similar also on the eve of the Euro-elections. It distributed checks on the order of 40,000-50,000 drachmas to farmers without explaining that these monies came from Community subsidies.

In the European Parliament, the need for close cooperation among our nation's parties is necessary now more than ever. National issues require this cooperation, since relations both with the United States-NATO and also with neighboring Turkey are not on a relaxed level. Only recently it was again announced that foreign Eurodeputies who are disposed in a friendly way toward Turkey are feeling inclined to reintroduce in the European Parliament the issue of the "Turkish minority" in Thraki. Even the open wound of the Cyprus question needs the formation of a unified political front for the enlightenment of the EEC's parliamentary body.

The expected discussions in Strasbourg and Brussels on the EEC budget ought to find our own Eurodeputies coordinated and aligned in a single direction--the interests of Greece. And at this point it is deputy minister Theod. Pangalos, the man responsible for EEC matters, who will have a great responsibility in determining whether or not we will manage to have this cooperative effort. The creation of a climate of trust towards the deputies and the constant briefing of these people about the government's policies and demands will help to form a "united front."

Of course, recent practices do not leave much room for doing this. The sweeping change in the European ticket of the ND and the partial change in PASOK's ticket have made it clear that the two large parties are using the posts at Strasbourg for the sake of "inner-party policy." Certain people were "beheaded" by PASOK through the charge that they were "being conciliatory" towards the "conservative forces." And the example of Filotas Kazazis in the ND will be of concern to many Eurodeputies. Because this Filotas Kazazis was characterized behind the scenes by the ND as an "alien body," for the reason that he worked together with the government and Euro-deputies of other parties in order to achieve the final passage of the finished Mediterranean programs, which in essence were of benefit to Greece alone. Certain agreeable talks after the fact by Evang. Averof were not able to persuade anybody that this ND Eurodeputy was not "sacrificed" for inner-party purposes.

But if the path to the national elections is a short one, then our group of Eurodeputies will be attenuated, since many will have to remain in Greece for the election campaign--L. Kyrkos, I. Boutos, P. Avgerinos, G. Mavros, Man. Glezos. These absences from Strasbourg will be distinctly felt if that period is a critical one in terms of Greek issues being raised at the European Parliament.

The EPEN [expansion unknown] and the European Parliament: The extreme Right will take advantage of the European Parliament as a rostrum for causing sensations, and it will try to "make the case" that the people imprisoned at Korydallos are "political prisoners," concerning which the parliamentary organ of the EEC should take a position.

Of course, a recent attempt to give the impression that the extreme-right group of the European Parliament will come to Greece in order to examine the issue of the junta "political prisoners" went nowhere. The chairman of the group Gallos Le Men explained that he does not have any such intention--at least for the present. The issue was created by a "council member" of EPEN--a former junta minister--who brought about this "news" leak in order to sound out domestic reactions. The government spokesman "suppressed" it: He began the announcements without waiting for the statements of Le Men which put things in their place. What else did the junta people want? They wanted to cause a sensation domestically, and they achieved this.

12114

CSO: 3521/354

PAPANDREOU POLICY INCREASINGLY DISAPPOINTS WEST

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 9-10 Sep 84 pp 1, 3

[Article by Rikhardos Someritis]

[Text] Paris--Andreas Papandreou has decided--for reasons of the election?--to provoke, at least verbally, a new increase in tensions in relations between Greece and the West.

This is what certain observers in Western capitals believe, and many others fear that this is so also in light of a series of recent reports and indications as to the activities of PASOK diplomacy.

Of these indications, the primary ones are the decision by Papandreou to officially visit Libya, the participation of Greece, in fact at a ministerial level, in the conference of the so-called "nonaligned nations" at Malta, and the personal participation of the premier (in his capacity as minister of defense--a capacity which is brought forth from oblivion only on exceptional occasions) in the NATO conference at the beginning of December in Brussels.

Concerning Kabul

Also, many other plans of Papandreou have been noted which are interpreted in the same way. And above all the plan imputed to him about officially visiting Jaruzelski's Poland.

"Why not Kabul as well?" The question is that of a Western diplomat. And it is not only said ironically: It sums up an opinion on Greek foreign policy which many leading figures now concur in.

The realization of Papandreou's international program presupposes of course that the Greek parliamentary elections will take place in 1985 rather than this autumn. Of course, if there is an immediate electoral showdown neither the trip to Libya nor the visit to Warsaw will take place. But it is believed that these plans are "useful" to Papandreou in both the one and the other case. Because they create in Greece--to the benefit of leftist public opinion--a climate of anti-Western cohesion which veils the also existing network of the country's ties to the West. Paradoxically, at bottom PASOK has affirmed these ties. Up to now.

The first indications of a new anti-Western fever on the part of PASOK, although of a rather domestic character, were given by the recent "skirmishes" concerning the (existing) problem of Limnos. As has been confirmed in any case, since 1981 this problem has not been improved by the sensational initiatives and propagandistic maneuvers of PASOK.

Now the participation of Greece in the conference of the "nonaligned nations" at Malta (where Greek diplomacy has passionately sought a chair on the sidelines as "observer") is again creating confusions about the long-range intentions of the present majority--above all if in the coming elections its "expansion" to the Left is confirmed. In any case, what is sensational is that Athens has not given reasons for this participation and has not defined its objectives.

The Trip to Libya

The trip by Papandreou to Libya also "suffers" itself from the same "infirmity": Until now, Greek diplomacy has not explained yet to concerned Greek public opinion what the framework is of the "Greek-Libyan friendship" and "cooperation," what its prospects and purposes are. And what the benefits are which counterbalance, if they do in fact counterbalance, the very clear damage to relations with most of the countries in Europe, America, and the Mediterranean which is brought about by every rapprochement with Qadhafi.

Of course, a visit by Papandreou to Warsaw would not produce more favorable reactions in any quarter where it is not considered "necessary" to "honor" Jaruzelski.

Finally, the personal presence of Papandreou in Brussels at the conference of NATO defense ministers, which he was not obliged to attend, "does not presage anything positive," say many observers. Their basis for saying so being both the "lessons of the past" and also the electoral prospects in Greece.

These emerging initiatives and moves of PASOK diplomacy also are associating themselves with the anticipated turning point on the Cyprus question, which whether it turns out to be negative or positive will be decisive to the future of more than just the Cypriot Republic. It will also be crucial to the awaited decision on the military purchases of the "century," which are not "limited only" to aircraft.

If there is a practical strategy which can incorporate all these contradictory factors within a common logic and in a common purpose, then "this must constitute the best-kept of all Greek secrets" said a Western diplomat recently. But he added that it is more likely that such a secret does not exist.

12114

CSO: 3521/354

PCI'S BARCA ON ETHIOPIAN PARTY'S FIRST CONGRESS

PM251257 Rome L'UNITA in Italian 22 Sep 84 p 7

[Interview with PCI Directorate member Luciano Barca by Giancarlo Lannutti in Rome; date not given]

[Text] Rome--Comrade Luciano Barca who, together with Comrade Maria Vittoria de Marchi, represented the PCI at the Addis Ababa celebrations for the 10th anniversary of the revolution and for the proclamation of the "Workers Party of Ethiopia" [WPE], was asked by us to give an overall assessment of the present situation in Ethiopia, in the light of an event--the inauguration of the party, following a lengthy, difficult process, full of contradictions--which seems to introduce an element of innovation and change.

"In my opinion the congress which led to the inauguration of the WPE marks an important event and a turning point in the course of Ethiopian life. It is difficult to say what the outcome of this turning point will be, but it is undoubtedly moving in a more democratic direction, because it marks the end of the military dictatorship and the transfer of real power to a party within which the armed forces remain a major element, but which also comprises--even at the top levels--representatives of associations, mass organizations, and movements which have developed over the years and which have formed widespread structures at the regional and provincial level. So the moment when the chief of staff entered the congress hall at the head of representatives of all the troops, swore loyalty to the party and to the Central Committee elected by secret ballot, and knelt to kiss the twin flags of Ethiopia and the party was not a formal act but was intended to mark in the eyes of the entire people a genuine transfer of power (the ceremony was shown several times on television).

In any case the birth of the party and the congress were not improvised but have taken place after 5 years of vigorous political struggle within the preparatory commission formed in 1979 (the COPWE--L'UNITA editor's note) and complete a lengthy process--that began even before the creation of the COPWE--of meetings and conflict among various Marxist and progressive groups, young and old sectors of the armed forces, and so forth.

[Lannutti] But does the fact that the military is still in such a large majority within the Central Committee and Politburo not justify the impression that the party is in fact precisely the party "of the military?"

[Barca] Undoubtedly the training of many cadres has taken place within the armed forces, which, following the collapse of 1974, became, on Mengistu Haile Mariam's initiative, the sole reference point for the whole of Ethiopia, the only guarantee of defense of its independence. However, it would be a mistake, in my opinion, to consider these cadres--who have been members of the armed forces at various times and who have taken part in conflicts that still make Ethiopia's life difficult and tense--as purely military cadres, since the majority of them have returned to civilian life and manage factories, offices, and cooperatives. Furthermore, the armed forces themselves have various kinds of training, with cadres who studied in America, others who were trained by Swedish instructors, cadres who trained in schools in the USSR, cadres who studied in Italian schools, and even, in positions of command, generals who combated fascism under the orders of the Negus. [sovereign of Ethiopia] Overall, delegates of the armed forces and public administration accounted for 71 percent of delegates and 60 percent of the Central Committee. It can therefore be reckoned that 50 percent of Central Committee members come from the armed forces.

On the other hand it must be borne in mind that this very congress eliminated the ban on public servants' joining trade unions. There will thus be a real flow into the trade unions, which represent a further aspect of transition to a "secularization" of the political structure and its greater rapprochement to civilian society.

[Lannutti] With regard to this "secularization," what is the significance of the party's formal definition as "Marxist-Leninist?" Some have seen in this purely and simply an alignment with the USSR and with the "model" that it embodies.

[Barca] I believe that over and above any other consideration there must be a calm assessment of the objective influence on Ethiopia of the fact that it depends almost totally for its armaments and essential commodities on aid from the USSR, while it suffers violent attacks from the United States and even from European countries. Having said that, I would like to stress that the congress reflected two not entirely reconciled attitudes. One, Marxist-Leninist, albeit amended by reference to a flexible implementation of the principles and special characteristics of each country, seemed somewhat dogmatic and simplistic. Together with this, there was, as reflected in Mengistu's report and throughout the course of the congress, a second attitude that I would describe as African-patriotic. At the congress Mengistu had the open support of all the most prestigious leaders of the African countries, irrespective of the various states' political stance. And Mengistu responded to this support by presenting not only a responsible and realistic program for Ethiopia but also a framework of African objectives that can be shared by countries of differing stances and that should attract the interest of Europe and the industrialized North: the struggle against famine, the struggle against the spreading desert, and the struggle for water and land irrigation. And at the congress these objectives were also of great value in uniting non-Marxist and nonsocialist elements.

In connection with Africa's internal problems too, Mengistu spoke very skillfully and prudently, not forgetting that he is resident chairman of the OAU.

[Lannutti] The topic of Africa's (and Ethiopia's) internal problems immediately raises the issue of the Eritrean problem, which is at the core of post-revolutionary Ethiopia's difficulties and contradictions.

[Barca] Indeed. The congress devoted much space to the problem of nationalities, stressing both the role of the party and the mass organizations and tools for a unification capable of spanning the various nationalities and uniting them around joint objectives, and the issues of local government and self-management. In our greetings message we stressed the need, within the integrity of the Ethiopian state, to respect the nationalities' identity and autonomy, and the congress applauded that passage. I believe that it is necessary to work in this direction because to envisage secessions or border modifications would have disastrous effects, by prolonging (but perhaps that is exactly what some people want) a state of guerrilla warfare that is preventing not only Ethiopia but also Eritrea and Tigray from taking off.

[Lannutti] What kind of reception was given to our delegation, and what are the prospects for a development of relations between the PCI and WPE, and more generally between Italy and Ethiopia?

[Barca] Our delegation was welcomed very cordially. The chairman of the congress replied to our greetings message with particularly cordial remarks both for the party and for antifascist Italy, and we encountered the same atmosphere everywhere. It must not be forgotten that there were in Addis Ababa delegations of liberation movements from all over the world, as well as from Africa, and that many asked us whether following Berlinguer's death there was any fear of a lessening of interest in the Third World and Africa. And our assurances about our desire to develop our commitment to the Third World in the same direction in which Berlinguer worked were welcomed with great satisfaction by everyone, irrespective of our interlocutors' stances. I must also say that Italy's cultural work is much appreciated (there are several Italian schools in Ethiopia) and that we also heard appreciative comments about Italian businessmen, both residents and otherwise, because they are more generous in supplying know-how, and so forth. We also heard the same words of appreciation expressed for Italy's representatives in Ethiopia. But obviously a negative influence is exerted by the alignment with U.S. stances that too often occurs in Italy's policy, and this ultimately facilitates other countries' initiatives, economically too.

CSO: 3528/2

SECTOR TRANSFER OF BEIRUT EMBASSY PERSONNEL AFTER THREAT

San Sebastian EGIN in Spanish 17 Sep 84 p 8

[Text] Beirut--A radical Shiite Moslem group called Musa Sadr Brigades has apparently threatened to kidnap the Spanish ambassador to Beirut or, failing that, some member of the Spanish diplomatic delegation.

As a consequence, the diplomatic and administrative personnel of the embassy were transferred yesterday from the western sector of the capital to the eastern zone, where the ambassador's residence is located.

The ambassador himself, Pedro Manuel de Aristegui, personally took responsibility for driving an embassy car to pick up the embassy secretary, Juan Manuel Molina, as well as Maria Jose de Lera, an administrative official, and Primitivo Martinez Mateo, director of the Hispanic Cultural Center. All of them had been residing in the western (Moslem) sector of Beirut.

The decision to move--temporarily--the Spanish embassy from West Beirut to the ambassador's residence in East Beirut came after the Lebanese Government decided last Saturday to send troops with light tanks to the embassy and to the ambassador's residence in Beirut.

The order to reinforce the protection of the Spanish representation in Beirut was given by the Lebanese Government to its security forces after it received confidential information that an attack on the embassy was being planned.

Apparently the first signs of a possible attack on the Spanish diplomatic headquarters were detected by the Lebanese Government's intelligence services, who had been alerted by other Western sources.

The threats that the Musa Sadr Brigades group was preparing this kind of action were confirmed yesterday when other, absolutely reliable sources informed Ambassador Pedro Manuel de Aristegui that the attack was planned for "the next few days."

Aristegui informed EFE that the objective of the attack supposedly being prepared was to kidnap either himself or, failing that, some member of the embassy staff in West Beirut.

The seriousness of this threat, which was also confirmed by other sources, led the ambassador to transfer the embassy personnel to his residence from where they reside in the western sector of the Lebanese capital, pending confirmation of the report and its possible consequences.

Aristegui told "Efe" that if the alleged threateners tried to kidnap him or any other member of the embassy staff, there could be a violent confrontation, given the protection now available. That was why he decided to transfer the embassy services to his residence for the time being.

The threats by the Musa Sadr Brigades came after the arrest of two Lebanese citizens in Madrid last week for allegedly perpetrating the attack on an official of the Libyan embassy in the Spanish capital. The official was only slightly wounded.

In claiming credit for this attack in Beirut, the Musa Sadr Brigades did not threaten the Spanish Government, and indicated only their desire "that Spanish authorities cease any and all cooperation with the Libyan intelligence services."

Last Saturday, however, an anonymous caller, also in Beirut, claimed credit for the attack in Marbella which cost the life of a Saudi citizen, on behalf of the Islamic Jihad (Holy War) organization. He demanded that the Spanish Government "immediately release" the two Lebanese suspects.

The Islamic Jihad communique stressed first of all that the Spanish state has nothing to do with these events, but asked "that our two comrades of the Brigades of Iman Musa Sadr be released immediately."

These two organizations, which are believed to be made up of radical Lebanese Shiite Moslems, have claimed credit for many attacks in the past, particularly in Lebanon.

In spite of everything, the ambassador did not change his plans to visit the Palestinian camps of Sabra and Chatila yesterday morning. Pedro Aristegui chatted with some Palestinian families, keeping his identity secret. "I am a Spanish journalist," he told them, and these simple people invited him to have coffee in their home. They told him how they live and what they think, 2 years after the horrible massacres took place on this date.

8926

CSO: 3548/3

EGUIAGARAY SEES GARAIKOECHEA 'NATIONALISM' COUNTERPRODUCTIVE

Madrid DIARIO 16 in Spanish 20 Sep 84 p 2

[Commentary by Juan Miguel Eguiagaray]

[Text] Just a few months ago the newspaper headlines proclaimed the results of a meeting between the president of the Basque Government, Don Carlos Garaicoechea, and businessmen in the capital of Spain. For several hours Garaicoechea answered the questions put to him, and according to the press, charmed his interlocutors. The market unity was not in danger; they had nothing to fear from the nationalistic economic projects; and the political autonomy movement in no way questioned the close economic ties that united the Basque Territory with the rest of Spain. That happened just a few months ago. But then summer came, and with that season, Garaicoechea's words changed along with the public at whom his statements were aimed. In the last 2 months he has addressed primarily his people, his own kind.

I don't know if you care to know that Carlos Garaicoechea, "lendakari" of the Basque Government, is a radical nationalist. I personally am not very concerned about it now that I know that he is a nationalist, but I understand that under certain circumstances this revelation could be disturbing. In any case, I fail to see how this revelation or his ardent defense of the right of self-determination, or his benevolent tolerance--let's be euphemistic--of the independence movement, can help resolve the problems that now exist between the state and the autonomous community. I have no comment about Carlos Garaicoechea's convictions; they are his convictions, not mine. But what is surprising is that Carlos Garaicoechea, constitutional "lendakari" of the autonomous government of the Basque Territory, can claim that his statements are loyal to the democratic state of which he is an ordinary representative. It is clear that Garaicoechea is in a head-to-head competition with the leaders of his party to win the title of the highest "abertzale" in Euskadi. But this really matters little to the majority of citizens in the autonomous community. Summertime jousts and tournaments notwithstanding, one must wonder if the radicalization of the "lendakari's" language and attitudes has any benefit for the statutory development process or if it contributes in any way to a minimal understanding between the citizens and the political forces of the Basque Territory. In my view, making innumerable summertime assertions that detract from his ability to serve as an interlocutor with the central administration, and ostensibly hindering his legitimacy as representative of all Basques--including non-nationalists--is a high price to pay for not rising even one

step in the ranking of the Basque "abertzalismo." I say that this is a high price because, having arrived at the point where Garaicoechea finds himself, after hurtling forward so quickly, it is not easy for him to restore a climate of understanding and serenity. Of course, emphatic rhetorical appeals for dialogue are not enough, especially if they are accompanied, so as not to lose momentum, by government declarations in which all the rest are portrayed as the compendium of all evils.

Nevertheless, Garaicoechea has reached the height of disloyalty to the democratic system not only because of his ideological statements, but also because of his active policy on the extraditions. The "lendakari" does not like the extraditions, and he opposes them. His big argument, apparently, is that they do not solve the problem, a matter on which we agree; but no one that I know of has said that the extraditions will solve the problem of terrorism by themselves. Nor will deportations solve it by themselves. But Mr Garaicoechea does not like either one; deportations make him skeptical and extraditions do not solve the problem. What must be done to make the Basque Fatherland and Liberty Group (ETA) boys stop killing? Apparently none of the available legal and democratic methods can be used to prevent them. What must be done is to negotiate politically with them. And what does that mean? Well, it means--I suppose he will contradict me if I misinterpret him--that the ETA members should refuse to lay down their arms unless the "lendakari's" positions on the Statute and other nationalist demands are accepted. In this way the ETA will render the ultimate service to the nationalist cause. The democratic nationalists who naturally disavow the hateful and murderous methods of the ETA, but claim to defend the same strategic objectives, would have no reason not to take advantage of the pressure being exerted by the submachine guns (objectively, without any involvement on their part), if that would help achieve what otherwise appears difficult to achieve. It would be a serious mistake, then, for the ETA to be conquered by the democratic state without a political negotiation allowing it to take advantage of its power to blackmail. If such an event were to take place, therefore, as the "lendakari" has pointed out, the "Basque problem" would be these very people, that is, the members of the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV). The possibility of the emergence of other armed groups in the place of the ETA could not be excluded.

It is difficult to reach an understanding with Garaicoechea as long as he maintains these positions. I am not referring only to the central government, but also to the important group of Basque citizens who believe in autonomy, and want more than anything else the pacification of the Basque Territory, but who have taken the Statute as seriously as the Constitution. For these people, among whom can be found Socialists and PNV voters, Garaicoechea's radicalization, aside from his internal battles with the "burukides," is leading nowhere but a dead end in the search for solutions to current problems.

It is a shame that the PNV leadership cannot resolve this issue once and for all. As long as they fail to do so, we will surely have to continue putting up with the pointless radicalization of a weak president and the frustration that comes from knowing that behind the threats and nationalistic harangues there is no real way to find peaceful coexistence and self-government for this people, other than an understanding with the state under the auspices of the Constitution and the autonomy Statute.

NEAR COMPLETE BASQUE PSOE SUPPORT FOR PARTY LINE

Madrid ABC in Spanish 20 Sep 84 p 24

[Article by Alvaro Hernando]

[Text] Vitoria--The provincial assemblies preparing for the 30th Congress of the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) have revealed, in the case of Basque Socialists, that the majority of their delegates, almost without dissidence, will support the official philosophy of the current party leadership. They will vote almost unanimously for "the Congress to be won by Gonzalez and Guerra."

The topics that have drawn the attention of the PSE [expansion unknown] assemblies are the economic crisis and unemployment, the status of the autonomous governments, and the debate on NATO. There is basic agreement with the government's statements and measures taken to date concerning the analysis of all these questions (except for the latter one, on which there is more resistance to the government's apparent position) and the means to be arbitrated. It is no coincidence that prominent Basque Socialists are serving in the federal executive, such as the president, Ramon Rubial; PSE Secretary General "Txiki" Benegas, or Enrique Mugica.

Nonetheless, this similarity of positions on official issues does not mean that there will be no differences of opinion. As has been indicated previously, the departure from NATO, which the Alavese Socialists have already advocated (and all indications are that those of Guipuzcoa and Vizcaya will favor it as well), will be a major difference. But the Basque Socialists do not appear to be willing to make this matter a point of contention that will open the doors to dissent.

The representatives of Basque Socialism are definitely preparing to back the theory turned reality, that the party comes before everything else. This party is personified by its highest offices, now also in the government, and they claim that these officials must be supported at all costs.

Socialist Left has not even been formed, and has no representative leader.

The PSOE in the Basque Territory, which just over a year and a half ago had fewer than 4,000 members, now has 5,600 affiliates. Thus, since 28 October the PSE has grown quantitatively on the internal level at a rate of nearly 50

percent. While this increase is not what most people expected, it is at least satisfactory, considering the pressure the party and its members have been subjected to (to wit: the various attacks on the people's houses in different locations, the threats against some of the most qualified members, prompting many to resort to bodyguards, and the murder of Enrique Casas).

Perhaps these same circumstances, in addition to other considerations, have had a major impact--especially in the last autonomy elections of 26 February--in making Socialism the second-largest political force in the Basque Territory since 28 October.

Moreover, these same circumstances have undoubtedly had a lot to do with the fact that Basque Socialists have flocked to support the undisputed leadership of the Benegas-Damborenea team. These two men have very different and very strong personalities, and on specific occasions they have disagreed.

Now, looking toward this 30th Congress, the PSE will contribute its own speeches on crucial issues such as the economic crisis, autonomy and NATO. On the first and second issues it will agree basically with the statements, positions and measures defended in practice by the government.

8926

CSO: 3548/1

VIEW OF SWEDISH NEUTRALITY IN SOVIET MEDIA EXAMINED

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 11, 12 Sep 84

[Op Ed article by Kristian Gerner]

[11 Sep 84 p 3]

[Text] Kristian Gerner is a doctor of philosophy in history at Lund. He is an expert on the Soviet Union and East Europe.

Like all human communication, international politics is a matter of messages between a sender and a recipient. The message may consist of words or actions or of words and actions combined. The one who sends the message has a purpose in doing so.

The recipient is not a mindreader, but must interpret the message. That interpretation takes place with the help of the recipient's general frame of reference and his own experience with the sender in question. His interpretation of the sender's intentions is not necessarily the correct one. Moreover, words spoken or acts committed with no intention at all behind them may nevertheless be construed by someone as a message directed precisely at him or her.

Relations between Sweden and the Soviet Union during the 1980's have increasingly come to be a matter of breakdowns in communication--of discrepancies between the way in which certain Soviet actions have been interpreted on the Swedish side and the way in which it is said that they ought to have been interpreted on the Swedish side.

Verbal Aggression

This applies to the three well-known cases in which the Swedish Government protested against Soviet military violations of Swedish territory. In one case, the Soviet side claimed that the violation had been unintentional, and in the other two cases, it claimed that no violations had occurred. From the Soviet standpoint, the Swedes misinterpreted unintentional conduct as an intentional act in the first instance, while in the other two instances, they interpreted--and reacted to--actions that in fact had not occurred.

If we are to take the Russians at their word, the discord between Sweden and the Soviet Union is due to Swedish words--that is, the three unwarranted (from the Soviet viewpoint) protest notes. The notes are a form of Swedish verbal aggression against the Soviet Union. On receiving the aggressive Swedish messages, one can interpret them in three ways.

One can take the view that the Swedes, being crazy, are hallucinating and raving. Or one can believe that Sweden has intentionally adopted an aggressive policy. Or, finally, one can assume that the Swedes are acting in good faith--that is, that they noted events which they mistakenly felt that Soviet authorities were responsible for, even though that is not the case.

Ought To Make an Effort

If the Soviet powers that be had adopted the third interpretation and were also interested in having a trusting relationship with Sweden, they ought to have made various efforts to prove their innocence. Not because, having been wrongfully accused, they were under a legal obligation to do so, but because it ought to be important to them for political reasons to rid the Swedes of the delusion that there was reason to be displeased with the Soviet Union.

That is not what happened. The Soviet Government does not seem to be assuming that the Swedes acted in good faith but without real justification--or at least not all Swedes.

If the Soviets considered the first interpretation reasonable--that is, that Swedish authorities are crazy--there would be no reason even to bother about trying to persuade them with assurances of innocence. Crazy people are not receptive to any arguments, and schizophrenics may suffer new hallucinations without any external stimuli.

Moreover, it might be a good idea to beef up one's military preparedness, since madmen might translate words into action. There have been no signs that the Russians have adopted that interpretation.

Sweden a Divided Land

There remains the possibility of interpreting the Swedish protest notes as an expression of deliberate verbal aggression. From all indications, the Soviets have considered that interpretation the most reasonable one. Let us look more closely at what that interpretation implies.

If one keeps up with what is written and said about Sweden in the CPSU-controlled mass media, one sees that Sweden is being presented as a divided country. On one side, there are evil forces--nonsocialist parties and newspapers, scholars and military men--that want to make Sweden part of U.S. imperialism's "crusade" against the Soviet Union. And on the other side, there is a good man who feels that the security interests of Sweden and the Soviet Union coincide and who is fighting on behalf of that idea.

That good man is Sweden's prime minister, Social Democratic Party leader Olof Palme.

Palme Innocent

Before I describe the Soviet picture of Palme, I want to emphasize the importance of keeping the sender's intentions separate from the recipient's interpretation. It is not a question here of Olof Palme's real intentions in pursuing his policy. It is a question only of how the Soviet side says it interprets those intentions.

According to the Swedish Foreign Ministry's compilation "Sweden in the Foreign Press in 1983," and excluding references in connection with sports, Sweden was mentioned about 300 times that year in Soviet press items and articles. The submarine issues dominated. The thesis advanced was that the submarine issue reflected the fact that the Pentagon and NATO, "with support from Swedish reactionary circles, especially within the military, are trying to bring Sweden to abandon its neutrality." Olof Palme, on the other hand, stood out as innocent in Soviet eyes, according to the compilation by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

"Although it was the prime minister--at the press conference and in talks with the Soviet ambassador to Stockholm--who presented the Swedish Government's viewpoint and delivered the protest (on 26 April 1983), Olof Palme has consistently received favorable treatment in the Soviet media. The only time he was mentioned by name in connection with the submarines was in an article that appeared in IZVESTIA on 2 June, where it was reported that Palme had attacked the Conservatives for using the submarine incidents in the election campaign. The writer of the article emphasized at the same time that it was the Conservative view of the submarines that had prevailed in the commission's report, and with careful phrasing, he deplored the fact that 'responsible Swedish circles'--by which he presumably meant the government--were unable to draw the 'correct conclusions' from the stories about submarines."

Good Knight

As is known, there were also several occasions during the period in question when Olof Palme accused his domestic political opponents of undermining the Swedish policy of neutrality with "anti-Sovietism" and emphasized that the Swedish Government would in no way join in the U.S. "crusade" policy against the Soviet Union.

Those statements were naturally noted by the Soviets. It was not Olof Palme's fault--and, of course, not the Soviet Government's, either--that the Soviet Union's policy had been criticized in Sweden, said Soviet commentators.

Now it is 1984. The Soviet media have continued to build up the picture of Olof Palme as the good knight. It began in connection with the Stockholm Conference, after Palme's talk with Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Gromyko.

Follows Soviet Pattern

On 8 February of this year, the Soviet weekly magazine LITERATURNAYA GAZETA published an interview with Olof Palme by Vladimir Lomeyko. What is noteworthy about the interview is not primarily what Palme said, but the way in which he is presented and the framework in which his statements are placed.

Lomeyko emphasizes that Palme is chairman of the Palme Commission and then mentions that he is a veteran Social Democratic politician and also Swedish prime minister. That fully occupied statesman "kindly" agreed to the interview. That way of introducing Olof Palme follows the Soviet pattern for introducing people whom the reader is supposed to regard favorably.

The interview itself begins with Lomeyko explaining to Palme that the latter "as an individual is known in the Soviet Union as a politician who is seriously disturbed by the increasingly tense situation in the world and who is making an effort to solve the global problems facing mankind, in particular the most terrible of them all, the growing arms race."

Support Soviet Peace Policy

In the interview, Olof Palme does not dwell on the open wars and conflicts now in progress. Instead, he explains that the preservation of peace is the most important issue of our time. He dwells in particular on how horrible a nuclear war would be and claims that even President Reagan has said there can be no winner in such a war.

In general, Palme maintains a neutral tone in his answers to the Soviet reporter, but the latter injects comments giving the reader the impression that Palme and the Soviet leadership share the same attitude and that their attitude differs from that of the warmongers in NATO. When Palme says that "confidence-building measures" are important, Lomeyko interjects that Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Gromyko has emphasized exactly the same thing and then adds that the neutral and alliance-free countries have an important role to play in that connection.

The point in Lomeyko's commentary is that neutrality means supporting the Soviet Union's peace policy, the logic being that it is the Soviet Union that wants peace and that one is not neutral unless one combats the warmonger, which is the United States.

[12 Sep 84 p 3]

[Text] The theme of Swedish neutrality, Palme, and good contacts with the Soviet Union, which was taken up after the meeting between Palme and Gromyko in January, reappeared in the Soviet media in June of this year in an article on international cultural contacts. The article, written by Soviet Minister of Culture Demichev, was published in the Communist Party's theoretical and political journal KOMMUNIST (No 10, 1984).

Demichev points out that the Soviet Union has especially intensive cultural contacts with neutral Austria and Sweden, "which pursue a positive and very active foreign policy." In this context, "positive" must be understood as "rated highly by the Soviet Government."

It is true, says Demichev, that there were anti-Soviet provocations in Austria in connection with the Vienna Festival, but as far as Sweden is concerned, the picture is bright. At the request of its friends, the Soviet Ministry of Culture

was able to send performers to the "Women for Peace" Congress in Sweden, and "Sweden's Prime Minister Olof Palme has emphasized that his country is interested in cultural exchanges with the Soviet Union."

Mentioned Favorably

Demichev points out that other capitalist countries also want good cultural relations with the Soviet Union. The interesting thing is that the only person to be mentioned favorably in this context is Palme and that, except for party and government leader Chernenko and U.S. President Reagan, he is the only one the author deigns to mention by name in the whole article.

Reagan is described as a "bad guy" whose intentions are all shameful, the reason being that his talk about the desirable features of cultural contacts conceals "an ambition to establish channels for influencing our creative intelligentsia and, through them, public opinion in our country." No such subversive intentions are ascribed to the "good guy" in this scene: Olof Palme.

On 15 August of this year--that is, 6 days after the latest known Soviet violation of Swedish territory--Soviet Radio's equivalent of our "Lunch Echo" program emphasized in its summary of the day's world news that Olof Palme had addressed the Swedish Social Democratic Women's Congress and had again given expression to Sweden's positive policy of neutrality.

Statements With Hidden Reservation

Lastly, it can be noted that in an article on the antiwar movement that appeared in KOMMUNIST No 12, 1984 (signed to press on 13 August), there is an evaluation of the social democratic parties in the West. The author of the article points out that those parties which are in opposition are more sympathetic to the Soviet Union's policy than those that are in power--but among the latter, only the French, Spanish, and Portuguese parties are mentioned, not Olof Palme's Swedish party.

It is against that background that the Soviets interpret the Swedish Government's protest note of 7 September and Olof Palme's statements concerning the nature of the Soviet intrusions. Regardless of what Palme says, the Russians will interpret his statements as containing a hidden reservation: the "unprovable" intrusions can continue.

But even though the Soviets probably interpret Olof Palme's statements on the intrusions as a signal that the Swedish Government intends--although very unwillingly--to put up with the new situation, those statements neither explain nor justify Soviet policy.

Line of Defense Moved Forward

In the area of security policy, there is always reason to assume that a neighboring country's behavior is meaningful and purposeful. It is both reasonable and justified to try to see the complex of purposes behind the Soviet intrusions, which, after all, the Swedish Government has described on three occasions as having been verified.

The first thing one must bear in mind is that Soviet behavior, if it is interpreted as being purposeful, is the manifestation of a change. The Soviet Union has moved its line of defense in the Baltic Sea area forward. If that interpretation concerning intention is adhered to, it means that the Soviet Government has felt called upon to draw attention to an extension of its preserve and that as the situation now stands, it does not intend to renounce its pretensions.

Actually, the Soviet leadership has recently been explaining in various ways the fact that it has found it necessary to increase its defense preparedness.

After Two-Track Decision

Soviet military actions against Sweden have been occurring since NATO made its so-called two-track decision on the deployment of new nuclear missiles in the late fall of 1979. Those actions are occurring in a period when relations with the other superpower--the United States--are worsening. If one studies authoritative Soviet statements made during 1984, the following picture emerges:

Growing aggressiveness on the part of U.S. imperialism is forcing the Soviet Union to increase its defense capability. It has been forced, since NATO began deploying its new missiles in West Europe, to put its guard up. The "socialist big power" (Chernenko's expression) rejects the idea of appeasement. It is true that the Soviet Union does not need "foreign territory," said Chernenko in a speech on 29 April, but it must "keep its powder dry."

In a statement on 28 May, Chernenko further stated that it was necessary to strengthen the people's nurturing for wartime patriotism, foster hatred of the opponent, and instill preparedness for heroic deeds. The situation is just as serious as it was in the 1930's. Then it was Hitler who was threatening peace, and now it is Reagan's United States.

Previous Appeasement

The United States is trying to use West Europe as a platform in its efforts to achieve world domination. The Soviet Union must strengthen its defenses through "necessary measures," and no country in Europe can stay out of that trial of strength. One must take a stand either for or against the United States--either for or against the Soviet Union. All of that was brought out clearly in an editorial in KOMMUNIST in January of this year (Issue No 1).

By exerting military pressure on Sweden, the Soviet Union may be trying to restore the balance that it regards as having been upset by NATO's strengthening of its military capability in West Europe. The Soviet Union has little to lose but much to gain through such a policy.

It is not very likely that Sweden will throw itself into NATO's arms because of the Soviet intrusions. Its freedom from alliances is the very basis of Swedish foreign policy. On the other hand, it is known that the Swedish Government has made concessions in the past to strong and determined neighboring states in crisis situations.

Take USSR's Side

The Soviet version of history in connection with World War II is careful to point out that Sweden gave in to Nazi demands for the right to move troops through Sweden during the period immediately following the German attack on the Soviet Union in 1941. It is certainly also remembered in the Soviet Union that Sweden's government was eager to adjust to the new situation after the war, when the Soviet Union emerged as a big power in the Baltic Sea area.

The surrender of the Baltic in 1946, the feeble behavior in the Wallenberg case, and Sweden's actions in the credit negotiations of 1946 were indications of that.

According to Soviet doctrine, Sweden's appeasement of the Nazis was a misuse of neutrality. In the Soviet view, neutrality can certainly be combined with one-sidedness, and indeed ought to be. But one must take sides with the right side--that is, the Soviet Union. According to the Soviet premise, the Swedes ought to be grateful, if anything, for the opportunity to make their neutrality "active" and place it in the service of the Russians.

Knows the Ropes

In this connection, it is worth pointing out that Ponomarev, the CPSU's international secretary, stated in an article in KOMMUNIST in May of this year (No 8) that the Supreme Soviet had announced on 29 December 1983 that the Soviet Union did not want to ensure its own security at the expense of other states or in such a way as to harm other people's interests.

Ponomarev knows the ropes, considering that he was active as far back as 1939, under Stalin. This is what PRAVDA said on 4 December of that year, a few days after the attack on Finland:

"Only the Soviet Union, which rejects as a matter of principle the idea of conquering territory by force and enslaving people, could agree to make its military power available, not for aggression against Finland and the enslavement of its people, but for guaranteeing Finland's independence... and establishing friendly relations with Finland."

Before a year had passed following that statement, the Soviet Union had conquered a piece of Finland by force and enslaved the Baltic peoples and had also taken Bessarabia and Bukovina away from Romania.

Where Are "New Carolines" To Be Found?

Why conjure up the ghosts of the past--why paint such a fiendish picture of the Soviet Union? Why look at history and its deeds--why look at the current war in neighboring Afghanistan?

Why not rely on the Soviet leadership's assurances and promises--why not take it at its word when it says it has no aggressive intentions? Because the Russians themselves have not forgotten that history. They are proud of it.

In the late STOCKHOLMS-TIDNINGEN, those who currently portray the Soviet Union as a threat were called "new Carolines" [a reference to soldiers under Charles XII in the 18th century]. In the face of such arguments, one can only point out quietly that it was Russia that attacked Sweden in 1700, not the other way around. The "arch-Caroline," Charles XII, began his reign by paying no attention to the threat from Czar Peter. So where, in fact, are the "new Carolines" of today to be found?

Historical Experience

On 5 September, AFTONBLADET deplored the Soviet Government's rejection of the first Swedish objection to violations of its airspace with the argument that it created "further difficulties for a government that is trying to silence the anti-Soviet strains among Conservatives." But what is it that is actually provoking those "anti-Soviet strains" if not the Soviet Union's policy toward Sweden?

The fact that the Soviet Union stands out as militarily aggressive in relation to Sweden is due to the Soviet Union's actions. That dark picture was not created by anyone in Sweden. If one looks at today's Swedish-Soviet relations against the background of historical experience with the Soviet Union's policy toward small neighboring states, the conclusion seems to be that it is wiser to take the threat seriously than to make light of it.

11798

CSO: 3650/285

OZAL DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACY IN 'INTELLECTUALS PETITION' CASE

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 16 Sep 84 pp 1,8

[Text] Prime Minister Turgut Ozal stated that "since a group of people could write a petition and make it reach the highest office in the land there must be democracy in Turkey". The investigation of whether the petition has violated the law should also be considered as part of the "democratic process", according to Ozal. Drawing attention to the point that "there are quite a few people in the world who do not want to see Turkey become powerful and strong", Ozal said: "We should never forget that the enemy is waiting in ambush. We should always recall the expression that 'water may sleep but the enemy never does'. We have to proceed safely without giving cause to any internal strife."

Speaking at the second and final day of the symposium organized by Aydinlar Ocagi under the title "The Reasons behind 12 September and the Stakes Played over Turkey", Ozal made the following points with regard to "those who want to subdivide Turkey" and their operational plans:

"Those who want to subdivide Turkey have a number of objectives. For instance, the straits, neighboring oil-producing countries, our natural resources, etc. These countries do not wish to see Turkey become powerful. Our getting stronger contravenes their interests. And it is too bad that our enemies can no longer reach their objectives by means of war. As is the fashion these days they are trying to subdivide our country. Consequently inner divisions emerge. Divisions begin to appear at every level of government. Their aim is to weaken the state and expose it as weak. They start with the police force. First they try to demonstrate that the police is inadequate. They make allegations of torture. They then say that the police is 'fascist'. The huge economic problems of the 1970s had much to do with people being ensnared by these individuals. Turkey turned off from the edge of precipice by the 12 September intervention. Yet the danger is not completely over. Having lived through the 'rightist-leftist' divisions, which in our opinion have constituted the greatest danger, we are deliberately avoiding using those terms. Turkey is developing fast, and growing which makes some people jealous of us. There have been changes of such magnitude during the last four years with regard to the economy and stability that no other country in our stead could have achieved such a result."

Prime Minister reminded that during his press conference in Federal Germany the investigation of 56 people in connection with the 'intellectuals petition' came up. A journalist asked: "Wasn't this evidence of democracy's absence in Turkey?"

Ozal elaborated on this point:

"Let us not dwell upon whether they happen to be (enlightened enough to be called) intellectuals or not. Since a group of people are capable of writing and sending a petition to the highest offices of state there is indeed democracy. However, the investigation of whether the petition contains an illegality or not is also a democratic process. Some people are looking at the issue from one side only. We should be very careful about such subtle nuances."

12466

CSO: 3554/316

VALMET CONDUCTING CAMPAIGN TO FIND EXPORT SALES FOR VINKA

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 4 Sep 84 p 19

/Article by Jukka Knuuti: "Valmet Tries to Sell Propeller Turbine Airplane"

/Text/ Turbovinha /Turbo Trainer/ is sold, for example, in the Swiss INTERNATIONAL DEFENCE REVUE. The airplane is presented in drawings because it is not ready to be photographed yet. The continual revamping is indicated, for example, by the fact that the plane's external appearance was retouched between the journal's July issue and the August issue.

Valmet is trying fervently to sell the improved version of the primary training plane Vinka, the Turbovinha equipped with propeller turbine motor and retractable landing gear. The working model of the L-80 TP--it will be ready for its first flight early next year--is being presented with pictures and brochures right now at the Farnborough aeronautics fair under way in England. The plane has also been advertised for the past few months in certain international military publications.

The Vinka is still being presented at Farnborough as well; as at several earlier international exhibitions, it is piloted by Lt Col Paavo Janhunen. Vinka has not sold well over the years, although Valmet advertises hopefully in the previous manner for certain open offers.

How It is Going at Kuorevesi

Valmet's hoped-for airplane sales depend a great deal on how the new manufacture of domestic airplanes is going at Kuorevesi. The entire Vinka series of 30 planes is ready, and the Hawk fighter planes for training will be ready in about a year. The assignment after this is not known.

Turbovinha was one of those possibilities on the basis of which the aeronautics industry committee--which handed in its report last February--suggested continuing domestic aircraft production. Not even the slightest sound has been heard, however, about the fate of the report from the Ministry of Trade and Industry.

Valmet is building the prototype of the Turbovinha with its own funds, because there is no knowledge of a single order. Air Force Cdr Rauno Merio has previously announced that the air force will need about 10 Turbovinhas.

The future of Valmet's new airplane is uncertain at this stage, unless money is earmarked for testing in next year's budget, for example.

In the same manner as Vinka, Turbovinha is also involved in the very tough international competition. Corresponding airplane types are in preparation and also in production, for example, in Brazil, Italy, France, Morocco, Switzerland, Spain, England and the United States.

12327

CSO: 3617/223

AZORES INTEGRATION IN U.S. COMMAND TERMED NATO 'ABERRATION'

Lisbon NACAO E DEFESA in Portuguese Jun 84 pp 89-94

[Excerpts] Renewal of the agreement relative to the Lajes Base and the interest shown by the United States in being granted facilities throughout Portuguese territory rather than just on Terceira Island--as is inferred from its preference for signing a blanket agreement--makes it appropriate for the Portuguese to be aware of the role played by our country in the interdependent system of a West to which Portugal belongs for well-known reasons of a geographic, historical, cultural, economic, and political nature.

Portugal and Western Security

The unequalled importance of Portuguese territory as a whole to the NATO military defense system can be judged from the fact that Portugal was invited to participate in that alliance as a founding member even though its political system was not a democratic one at the time. An identical invitation was not issued to Spain on that occasion, and this shows that Portuguese geostrategic potentialities were considered superior to those of Spain in that connection. As a matter of fact, air bases in the Azores had contributed conspicuously in the final years of World War II to the Allied victory over German submarines in the Battle of the Atlantic, thus making North American help for maritime Europe and the final defeat of the continental power possible. It happens that that same possibility of help, because it was in fact decisive in both world wars, is now considered a prominent element in deterring a conventional attack by the Warsaw Pact countries on the East European front. And because West Europe's geopolitical alignment with North America is in turn recognized as a vital element in the very survival of the United States and the West over against the hegemonic power of Eurasia, Portugal's participation in NATO constitutes an inestimable service not only to the Europe of the EEC and that of the eastern front, but also to European countries that are looked on as independent or neutral as well as all countries anywhere in the world that want to be free.

Lajes and the Rest

In that connection, it is worth emphasizing that the natural tendency is to try to protect those supply routes from the serious air and submarine threats of the Warsaw Pact by placing them within the Portuguese territorial mass, and this tends to confer growing importance on the Iberian Atlantic Area (IBERLANT) Command, whose headquarters are in Oeiras, and on support points in Madeira and on

the mainland in addition to the traditional site in the Azores. This constitutes a positive factor in terms of national Atlantic solidarity and harmony and even a strong operational argument to be firmly raised against those invoked for keeping the Azores within an area whose command is located in the United States--a geopolitical aberration by NATO which unfairly harms the interests of harmony as they relate to the political importance and freedom of action of a steadfast ally, which Portugal is.

U.S. Rapid Deployment Force

As was predicted by U.S. geostrategists Spikman and Sversky, Eurasia's peripheral regions--specifically those on which the United States and primarily many West European countries and Japan are highly dependent for petroleum and essential raw materials--have become the stage of indirect confrontation between the expansionist continental power and the maritime power trying to contain it. It is precisely the awareness of the existence of a common threat to those vital interests that has led to suggestions for extending NATO to include other regions. Meanwhile, concern over the fact that the intervention in Afghanistan is bringing Soviet military power closer to the Persian Gulf and over the possible effects on Western security of Islamic fundamentalism's "anti-Western crusade" in key countries (such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and also Israel) has led the United States to establish a capability for direct military intervention in the regions of the Middle East and Southwest Asia. What this involves is the well-known Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) with its forward bases on land and sea. The hope is that those structures will lead to more moderation in the USSR's geopolitical opportunism and to an increased will to resist that opportunism on the part of countries in the most exposed regions.

That framework of developments forms the background to the recent renewal of the agreement for use of the Lajes Base by the United States and the desire to obtain facilities on the mainland as well. The reason is that because of its geographic location and political reliability, Portugal is a better springboard than the possible alternatives in Spain or Morocco for the RDF and for the flow of logistic support that the RDF will require.

Inherent Risks of "Vital Link"

Preparations for the negotiations with Portugal were accompanied at times by statements by highly placed U.S. officials to the effect that Portugal was a "vital link in Western defense" and by recriminations concerning other allies--among them Spain--because unlike Portugal, they are not in the habit of facilitating movements by U.S. military forces during serious crises in the Middle East. But if we are to believe the INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE of last 17-18 December, Portugal is not high up on the list of countries being considered for U.S. military aid. The top countries are Israel (\$1.4 billion), Egypt (\$1.1 billion), Turkey (\$900 million), and Spain, Greece, South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand, for which the amounts are presumably still under discussion. With the exception of Spain, all of those countries have an enemy or a war at their doorstep. In Portugal's case, according to the same newspaper (14 December), \$145 million annually are regarded as sufficient, and not even all of that is for military aid.

In terms of risk, it happens that Portugal cannot be regarded merely as a rear area if there is a conventional military conflagration. In fact, there are Soviet strategists who maintain that in case of war, an attempt should be made before all else to neutralize the facilities enabling North America to help West Europe, especially since that would have the virtue of possibly stopping hostilities at that point, thus avoiding a campaign in Europe that would devastate the latter's industrial and agricultural wealth. In corroboration of that, there have been German strategists who attributed their country's defeat in World War II to the fact that it did not follow that precise course of action.

And it should not be thought that Portugal is protected by the fact that the defenses of Europe and Spain stand between it and the Warsaw Pact. Not only is there more to Portugal than the mainland, but Soviet military forces, aircraft, and missiles may not feel obligated to follow the geographic funnel of Europe and the Pyrenees on their way to Portugal just to satisfy the wishes of the heirs to the Maginot preconception. If such an attack occurred, it could very well come from the much more vast quadrant of the sea and even with a greater element of surprise--for example, from submarines carrying cruise missiles with conventional warheads or by vertical assault forces, as happened in Afghanistan.

Military Competition From Spain

Portugal cannot enjoy the fruits of political influence and compensations consistent with the geostrategic value of its territory if it loses sight of the fact that its individuality and importance are due to its "de-Iberianization." This means that it must do nothing to help Madrid become the peninsula's decisionmaking center in the economic, financial, and also military areas as the specific result of an integrated Iberian defense system set up on the pretext of a war which, in the final analysis, will probably not even happen, considering the risk of nuclear escalation. Things have gone well without such a defense--even during World War II--and there is no such thing even on the Scandinavian Peninsula, which is in plain sight of the USSR.

The war lies elsewhere. For example, it serves no purpose for Spain to participate in the military defense of the West through a treaty with Washington whose results (in addition to the preferential treatment that would cancel the importance of the Portuguese IBERLANT and also acquiesce in U.S. defense of the Azores) would be: 1) military aid that is not in proportion to the value and reliability of contributions by the two countries or the inherent risks, and 2) a military imbalance that the United States has not been concerned to offset, unlike its reaction to the sensitive pairs constituted by Turkey and Greece or Israel and Egypt.

It would obviously be better for Portugal if Spain were to become integrated with the NATO military defense apparatus, where it would play a regional role actually consistent with the geostrategic extent of its territory, namely as guarantor of an area extending from the Balearic Islands through Gibraltar to the Canary Islands as a complement to IBERLANT, and in which it could not draw enough advantage from its naval and air power to compete with Portugal.

But chiefly, it is Portugal that will not be helping itself to be a "vital link" in terms of political influence and compensations if its strategic thinking, cohesion, and military power are not those best adapted to its geostrategic reality and national interests and if its sensitivity to security is not given the importance appropriate to a country which is simultaneously much coveted and very vulnerable.

On the basis of the above, it would be appropriate for a strategic concept of military defense, on which national military power must be based, to have in view the indispensability of "occupying" the entire Portuguese territory and the interterritorial maritime space (an "IBERLANT" enlarged to include the Azores) beginning in peacetime so as to be able to exercise the functional power which is inherent in the country's geostrategic potential and indispensable to defense of the sovereignty and the role and compensations to which Portugal is entitled in the West.

11798

CSO: 3542/134

AUTHORIZATION FOR REVIEW OF PURGED MILITARY'S FILES

Lisbon O DIA in Portuguese 6 Sep 84 pp 10-11

[Excerpts] The military who were purged from the active roster by the MFA-PC [Armed Forces Movement-Communist Party] in the period immediately following 25 April 1974 are going to be allowed to request a review of their status with a view to reestablishing their respective careers. The draft decree-law on the subject says that the military who were the targets of an ideological purge, "with no objective charges being brought against them, no guarantee of effective defense, and no opportunity for legitimate recourse, are still being seriously affected both morally and professionally."

The intention is that those military whose capability or moral and professional qualities are not open to doubt must be given the opportunity to have their military status reviewed and their careers reestablished.

The proposal states that the measures being recommended are "a realistic and feasible solution militarily and financially and do not deviate from the principles and rules that have governed similar situations involving other military men in the past."

The military in question are thus being granted permission to request a review of their status with a view to changing and rebuilding their careers. The draft decree-law provides that in case of death or incapacity on the part of the legal applicant, capacity is transferred in full to his spouse or, if there is no spouse, to his most closely related legal heir.

When revision of an applicant's military status is approved, it entitles him to have the time between the date on which his status was changed and the date on which the proposed legislation is applied to him counted as service time for all purposes. That service time will be included in the determination of seniority and promotions and in the calculation of pension amounts for reserve, retirement, and survivor's benefit purposes. However, it will not entitle him to any retro-active pay.

Military who return to active duty will be considered permanent supernumeraries either until they transfer to the attache classification or the reserve roster because of age or until they request transfer to the latter classification.

11798

CSO: 3542/134

MONCHIQUE RADAR CONNECTION WITH NATO DENIED

Lisbon DIARIO DE LISBOA in Portuguese 11 Sep 84 p 9

[Text] In response to a formal inquiry by the Assembly of the Republic as to whether the future air surveillance radar to be installed at Foia Summit in Monchique will be tied in directly with NATO in Brussels--making it a possible priority target in case of a nuclear conflict--the Air Force General Staff (EMFA) said yesterday that the future station's only purpose is "surveillance of the national airspace and of the related approach routes." The EMFA went on to say that the radar in Foia is not intended for other missions such as "the tracking and guidance of missiles, satellite tracking, or the installation of nuclear or other missiles." The staff headed by General Lemos Ferreira also said that the radar may cooperate, however, in other missions, examples being "air traffic control and surveillance of our territorial and adjacent waters."

The EMFA also said that the Monchique Municipal Chamber was contacted from the start and that "the process is not taking place without the knowledge of the inhabitants." It should be recalled that as recently as last 24 August, the chairman of the town council, Carlos Tuta (Socialist Party), said that the 1,500 contos that Minister of Defense Mota Pinto had decided to pay for the 11,000-square-meter site of the future Foia Radar Base constituted "robbery" of the local government by the central government. Carlos Tuta also disclosed that both the EMFA and the minister of defense "have constantly avoided dialogue, even though they know there are plans for low-cost housing in the area being expropriated."

And in a report published by the DIARIO DE LISBOA on 4 November 1983 under the headline "More Military Facilities for the United States: Foia in Algarve, a Priority Target," Carlos Tuta said--in statements never denied by the EMFA--that since the Foia project is part of SICCAP (Portuguese Integrated Air Control System), it will require international aid estimated at 9 million contos, will be financed largely by NATO, and will also include big investments and construction projects at the centers in the Pilar and Montejuto Mountains. In addition, according to what was stated in that same report, the SICCAP radar systems will be computerized, with direct links by terminal either to NATO headquarters in Brussels or to the alliance's headquarters for the Mediterranean area, located in Italy.

11798

CSO: 3542/134

GONZALEZ EFFORT TO SPUR EEC ENTRY; PROBLEMS PENDING

Madrid YA in Spanish 20 Sep 84 pp 3-4

[Text] Felipe Gonzalez, president of the Spanish Government, travels to Dublin today in a clearly diplomatic move, to visit the prime minister of Ireland. That country is currently presiding over the European Economic Community (EEC). Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Fernando Moran has not abandoned his natural optimism about Spain's membership in the EEC, and after the failure to achieve results in Brussels, he is placing his hopes in the meetings in Luxembourg in early October. Some Community sources, however, are beginning to express pessimism again that Spain will be able to join the EEC soon.

President Felipe Gonzalez leaves today for Ireland on an official visit, responding to the invitation extended by that country's prime minister. The visit will last 2 days, and its primary objective is to continue the negotiations for Spain's entry in the EEC. Ireland holds the presidency of the EEC for the latter 6 months of this year. Economics Minister Miguel Boyer and Secretary of State for the EEC Manuel Marin will accompany the president; they will meet with high-ranking Irish officials.

Today Felipe Gonzalez will have an audience with the president of the republic, and will hold the first round of talks with the prime minister. Friday the president of the Spanish Government will hold a press conference and will give a luncheon for top-ranking Irish officials. Then he will return to Madrid.

Europa Press has learned from Community sources that this trip has taken on particular significance at a time when, after the recent meetings of the EEC foreign ministers in Brussels, there seems to be new pessimism about a quick membership for Spain.

Aside from conversations about general topics, it is speculated that special attention will be given to fishing matters, which is a key element in Ireland's economic and Community policy, while for Spain it may be one of the primary obstacles to negotiations, as was evident in Brussels.

Moran Optimistic

Yesterday Foreign Minister Fernando Moran returned to Madrid from his journey on a Mystere of the Spanish Air Force, accompanied by Secretary of State for EEC Relations Manuel Marin. He went directly from the military zone of Barajas to Moncloa Palace to join the Council of Ministers.

In Brussels, before leaving for Madrid, Fernando Moran had attributed the lack of results at the Brussels meetings to "difficulties in coordinating the positions of the EEC member states." In his opinion, the stances of EEC members are moving together, and "the ten" are carrying out "a major effort at rapprochement." Despite the absence of concrete results, Moran expressed confidence that the discussions will achieve progress at the next negotiating session, which will take place in Luxembourg on 2 October.

Three Great Obstacles Remain

Sources in the EEC report that since the meeting of the diplomatic chiefs of the EEC, the broad lines of a Community position on the olive oil issue have begun to emerge. According to these sources, the foreign ministers were near agreement on that matter, based on a commitment to reorganizing the olive oil market in the EEC 2 years after Spain and Portugal become members.

The problems, primarily on the part of Greece and Italy, continue to revolve around establishing a mechanism to control surpluses of this product by setting guaranteed production thresholds, as some countries propose.

In the specific case of wine, the Spanish negotiators should expect the procedure adopted yesterday by those in charge of "Green Europe" to bear fruit. The EEC agriculture ministers decided to meet in Ireland beginning next Sunday, as well as 1 October in Luxembourg, in order to discuss the reform of the wine sector. This issue is essential to establishing a negotiating position in terms of the expansion of the Community. Production controls seem to be a trend in this sector as well, although the member states differ on how EEC surpluses should be combatted when the Community expands to 12 members.

EEC observers indicate that the fishing negotiations have been "poisoned" since the confrontation between the Portuguese and Community members, with the Common Market as a backdrop.

8926

CSO: 3548/1

EXPORTERS WARN OF STAGNATION WITHOUT NEW INCENTIVES

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 15 Sep 84 pp 1, 7

[Text] It is claimed that the 32 percent increase in exports in the last six months is temporary, and unless the abolished incentives are restored we will still find ourselves back in stagnation.

The first general meeting of the 20-member 'Exporters' Association' was held yesterday. The board of directors presented a report to the meeting evaluating the 1984 exports. It was pointed out that exports have risen due to artificial causes and therefore the present level is temporary. The report stated:

"Despite the lowering of tax rebates exports have risen 32 percent in the first six months of this year. We do not think that the situation should be viewed in optimistic terms. The increase is due to the accumulated demand created by last year's stagnation, as well as excess supply created by shrinking internal demand. We view the 32 percent increase despite the lowering of incentives as temporary, unfortunately. If the reduced incentives are continued we suspect that our exports may encounter another period of stagnation."

Speaking at the meeting, Chairman of the Board of Directors, Ibrahim Yazici argued that the shrinking sources of credit have caused the exports recession during 1983. He said:

"Unless an equally effective system is found to replace the reductions in tax rebates, it will be seen that these reductions will have adverse consequences for our exports during the current year as well. The withdrawal of incentives without having firmly secured the foreign markets cannot be considered as a positive measure."

Noting that there has been critical comments about their receiving special treatment, Yazici stated that the 20 firms that make up the Association have been responsible for over 40 percent of total exports in the 6-month period, adding that "about 30-35 trading firms are responsible for half the country's exports. This situation is being misinterpreted by the public."

The meeting demanded that the government's decision to reduce the export incentives be reviewed. The board report noted that until such time that exports attain a stable pattern it is necessary to maintain the incentives. The report is critical of recent measures such as the lowering of tax rebates in some groups of items.

It is argued that these measures are likely to cause considerable losses to firms which had made previous commitments.

Proposals

The exporters arranged their proposals under three headings. If these proposals do not receive proper consideration we might be heading for another period of stagnation, the report warned. There was a demand for priority to be given to export-oriented credits in the allocation of credits by the Central Bank and other sources of finance. The proposals of the Exporters' Association were cited in the report as follows:

--In order to mitigate the adverse effects of the increase in interest rates, the interest rate differential rebates should be reviewed, and interest rates should be brought to levels compatible with foreign competition;

--The Turkish lira ceilings implemented by the banks are inadequate. In order to neutralize this factor, which affects exports adversely, the ceilings should be increased. The tax rebate system should be continued until such time that at least 80 percent of today's exports establish stable markets;

--In the implementation of measures such as the lowering of tax rebates or establishing the fund structure, at least six months notice should be given to protect existing commitments;

--In exporting to countries whose share of our total exports are below 5 percent, certain supportive measures such as extra premiums should be provided;

--As to the clearing agreement countries, the practice of exports in exchange for oil should be continued;

--We should wait until 1985 to get the positive results of the import-export with the COMECON countries conducted by our members. And the relevant measure should be adopted permanently;

--In the import-export business conducted by trading companies, the accountability of the producer and the buyer should be increased, and that of the trading company should be limited.

The 20-member firms of the Exporters' Association which held its first general meeting are listed below:

1. Ak-Pa Tekstil Ihracat Pazarlama A.S.
2. Anadolu Eksport A.S.
3. Borusan Ihracat Ithalat ve Dagitum A.S.
4. Cam Pazarlama A.S.
5. Cotas-Colakoglu Dis Ticaret A.S.
6. Cukurova Dis Ticaret A.S.
7. Edpa Pazarlama A.S.
8. Enka Ithalat Ihracat Pazarlama A.S.

9. Exsa Export Sanayi Mamulleri Satis ve Arastirma A.S.
10. Imeks Sinai Mamulleri Dis ve Ic Ticaret A.S.
11. Izdas Izmir Dis Ticaret A.S.
12. Mepa Merkezi Pazarlama A.S.
13. Meptas-Manisali Evrensel Pazarlama ve Ticaret A.S.
14. Montesoglu Ihracat ve Pazarlama A.S.
15. Pro-Eks A.S.
16. Ram Dis Ticaret A.S.
17. Suzer Dis Ticaret A.S.
18. Tekfen Dis Ticaret A.S.
19. Temel Pazarlama Ithalat Ihracat A.S.
20. Yaşar Dis Ticaret A.S.

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CSO: 3554/318

BARLAS ON DANGEROUS TRADEOFFS IN OZAL ECONOMIC POLICY

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 16 Sep 84 p 1

[Editorial by Mehmet Barlas]

[Text] Journalists criticizing successive governments are confronted with a perennial complaint. The same complaint is being heard these days in circles close to the Ozal government. The critics of the government are being told that: "We took office at a very difficult time. Isn't it unfair to expect such serious problems to be resolved in so short a time?"

Our answer to such complaints is this:

No government, in recent or distant history of Turkey, has ever taken office under easy conditions. From this viewpoint, the Ozal government is probably the luckiest of them all. Law and order is not a problem. Thanks to martial law the army has shouldered the job of preserving the framework of order. Due to conditions pertaining to the "Transition Period" there is no serious and powerful opposition. Though some serious problems do exist in foreign policy, none of them can be considered as having reached crisis point. Foreign exchange shortage and the inability to make transfer payments no longer occupy the agenda.

All things considered Turkey is going through its most stable period of recent times. If Ozal government is partly responsible for this outcome--and we happen to believe so--then citizens of Turkey would be prepared to acknowledge that.

The criticism of Prime Minister Ozal and his government is directed against their failures which have their origin in imbalances reflected in the socio-economic structure. We are criticizing Ozal because there are indications of social discontent and it is for this reason that we demand a change of course, particularly in his economic policy, as well as his political approach.

For instance, though the increase in exports should be considered a success, Turkish currency is continually losing value, wages and salaries are not rising at the same rate, more goods are sold outside for less, and lesser amounts of imported goods are costing more. In 1984 exports have reached \$7 billion. Whereas in 1979 exports totalled \$2.3 billion. Thus Turkey has increased its exports nearly 3½ times in five years.

This means that due to the rise in the value of the dollar, exports have risen

35 times in terms of Turkish lira.

Since the domestic GNP has increased hardly 10 times, let alone 35, this indicates an alarming rate of pauperization.

In money rates, interest rates, and other demand-reducing measures the situation is more or less the same.

Ozal government should not merely say "there is no alternative, we should tighten our belts and earn foreign currency", or "we should not consume but save and invest".

First of all, the required adjustments can be made without them having to forego their fundamental principles, in which case the 'alternative policy' could still be implemented by Ozal himself. Furthermore, there is an alternative to this model which is not altogether too radical, and that is liberal economy with a social democratic content. Secondly, exporting through continual devaluation and lowering the price of goods causes the pauperization of the masses, reducing the value of labor to nil in the process. With such a model and costly money it is not possible to invest.

What we are trying to say is that Ozal government is at the threshold of either a big success or a dramatic failure.

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CSO: 3554/318

YAPI KREDI'S OZYEGIN OPTIMISTIC ABOUT BANKING SECTOR

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 16 Sep 84 p 9

[Interview with Husnu Ozyegin, general manager of Yapi ve Kredi Bank,
by Meral Tamer; date and place not specified]

[Text] General Manager of Yapi ve Kredi (Construction and Credit) Bank, Husnu Ozyegin, said that the Turkish banking sector has emerged out of the difficult period of 1981-83, predicting that the years 1984-85-86 will not bring major new problems as far as the banking sector was concerned. Selection of customers has been made easier for the banks to the extent that firms have been able to adjust to the economic policies implemented since 1980. Ozyegin has characterized the next 2-3 years as a period which is not pregnant to major new problems, but one in which the residual problems of 1981-82 will be eliminated. And the volume of business will increase due to increases in the banks' nominal capital.

Yapi ve Kredi Bank is celebrating the 40th anniversary of its founding. During the extraordinary shareholders' meeting to be held tomorrow, a motion will be carried to increase the nominal capital which, according to Ozyegin, will mean an increase in profitability as well as attracting large amounts of credit from abroad. Our questions to Ozyegin and his responses were as follows:

[Question] It is said that the problems encountered by the banking system in recent years have affected Yapi Kredi, too. How is Yapi Kredi trying to overcome these problems? What steps are being taken?

[Answer] First of all, I would like to draw a general picture of the banking sector as a whole. Following the 24 January measures and the July 1980 implementation of free interest rates the banks started to collect deposits and lend money with high interest rates for the first time in the economic history of Turkey. As interest rates went up during 1981-82 the banks pushed up the loan rates. Consequently, the banks faced their most difficult period since the founding of the Turkish banking system with regard to the collection of interest rates and principal. The 24 January Measures were not merely confined to high interest rates, however. As the export bandwagon started to roll, the banks' customers started doing business with countries and firms they knew nothing about. 40-50 new Turkish contractors started entering the Middle East market each year. As the entrepreneurs entered these new fields in a big way, Turkish banking also opened to the outside world, and the attendant risks of the banking sector increased correspondingly in a short time. By 1983-84 it was possible to tell the successes from the failures. Therefore the worst is over for the banking sector, and for Yapi Kredi.

[Question] Your words give the impression that better times lie ahead for the banking sector. But aren't frozen debts hanging over the banking sector like the sword of Damocles?

[Answer] I think a more comfortable period lies ahead for the banking sector. The customers have been tried, we know them now. The markets are established. It is not easy for new entrepreneurs to penetrate those established markets which means that it is less likely for the banks to deal with risky customers. I can say that the period of trial-and-error is over as far as the banks are concerned. Thus I expect no new major problems to arise during 1984-85-86. It will be a period during which the residual problems of 1981-82 will be worked out, such as the frozen debts problem as you have pointed out.

[Question] Do you really believe that frozen debts, which have become a sort of nightmare for our banking sector, could be eliminated in 2-3 years without creating major problems?

[Answer] I think that the banks should make some quick decisions regarding frozen debts, and start considering some discounts, the deposit and credit rates being at their highest now. It is expected that in the next few months the rates will start coming down. As rates go down, it will be easier to resolve these matters. Furthermore, those factories which are in trouble, where production has stopped will be able to attract buyers who will be purchasing these businesses at lower rates.

[Question] Can you give examples of cases where your bank has resolved the problem in such a manner?

[Answer] I don't want to cite actual names but in three months we got rid of 5-6 firms with outstanding debts in this way. We sold two textile plants, one of them in Usak, with discounts. In the automotive sector we provided supplementary financing to a firm which had unfinished trucks on its inventory. The trucks were completed and sold, and we collected our debt. We can multiply such instances.

[Question] Do you mean to say that frozen debts will not be increasing henceforth in the Turkish banking sector?

[Answer] It won't increase, it will come down. I absolutely mean that. And when the banks increase their capital, and raise their deposits, frozen debts will diminish several times over.

[Question] During these days when Yapi Kredi is celebrating its 40th anniversary its capital is being increased to TL 40 billion. At a time when money is scarce and expensive, how will this sum be secured?

[Answer] In increasing the capital of our bank from TL 5 billion to TL 40 billion, the TL 35 billion will be secured as follows: TL 12,5 billion will come from reassessment of the assets, TL 12,5 billion from the fresh money put up by the shareholders (the banking law requires that in increasing capital, the share-

holders should put up an amount of money equal to the amount of reassessment), and the remaining TL 10 billion will come from the sale of immovables. As far as the banking law is concerned it would have been sufficient for us to increase our capital to TL 33 billion inclusive TL 4 billion in reserves (or TL 29 billions without the reserves). However, as Turkey's credit rating abroad goes up our banks are opening to the outside world, and as we have seen, they are in a position to secure credit without state guarantees. The criterion used by foreign banks in issuing credit is the debtor banks' capital and balance sheets. As the Turkish lira loses value in terms of the dollar the value of the banks' capital (in dollar terms) also goes down. In deciding upon the TL 44 billion (with reserves) figure we wanted our capital, when converted to dollars, to reach the \$100 million level.

[Question] The name Yapi Kredi recalls associations with housing. Do you think about giving credit to the housing sector, entering into the mass housing business?

[Answer] There are ongoing transactions concerning 2-3 sites in Istanbul which are suitable for mass housing. I am of the opinion that Yapi Kredi will be a pioneer in the housing sector. I believe that from 1986 onwards we will be able to undertake projects of between 5-10 thousand housing units a year.

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CSO: 3554/317

ENERGY CONSUMPTION REGISTERS GREAT INCREASE

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 8 Sep 84 p 33

/Text/ Total energy consumption has increased tremendously since the end of last year. According to an energy survey by the Ministry of Trade and Industry, total energy consumption in the first 6 months was nearly six percent greater than a year ago. Electricity consumption grew about nine percent from the beginning of the year.

It is stated in the survey that "growth would now seem to have leveled off, and it is estimated that energy consumption at the end of the year will rise more slowly than at the start of the year."

Total energy consumption from January to June was altogether 13.4 million equivalent oil tons. Of this, the share of imported energy was 9.07 million equivalent tons and of domestic energy 4.3 million equivalent tons. Coal increased its share of total consumption by two percentage points, imported electricity by one percentage point and other domestic energy sources by one percentage point. The share of oil and water power declined, oil's by three percentage points and water power's by one.

Thirty-four percent of total energy consumption was produced by oil, 2 percent by natural gas, 11 percent by coal, 16 percent by nuclear power, and imported electricity covered 5 percent of it. The share of water power was 13 percent, peat 3 percent and other domestic energy sources 16 percent. Imported energy's share in total energy consumption was thus 68 percent or the same as a year earlier.

"The production stepup in the forest industry in particular has increased energy use. Consumption has risen more quickly than the production of wood-working products. The consumption of heating energy has also risen from the previous year due to raw weather," states the energy survey of the Ministry of Trade and Industry.

On the basis of sectoral data it is obvious, according to the survey, that the realistically computed energy prices have not tempted consumers in recent times into the kind of savings to which we got accustomed to in a period of sharply rising energy prices. The development is similar to the second half of the 1970's, when the prices previously dropped after a price crisis, it is mentioned in the survey.

Consumption of fuels in the forest industry in the January-June period increased 15 percent and the consumption of electricity 14 percent. The increase in fuel use in the rest of industry was three percent and the increase in electricity use five percent. The use of fuels for district heating and power grew 19 percent and for transportation 4 percent. The remaining consumption in fuels decreased two percent but increased eight percent in electricity.

Consumption of electrical energy increased about 9 percent from the beginning of the year, and 24.08 terawatt-hours of electricity were used up. Altogether 21.7 terawatt-hours of electricity were produced in Finland, or 7 percent more than in the January-June period last year.

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CSO: 3617/223

FRG, AUSTRIA, SWITZERLAND COMBAT AIR POLLUTION

Geneva JOURNAL DE GENEVE in French 31 Aug 84 p 13

[Text] Lucerne, 30 (ATS)--The FRG, Austria and Switzerland will combine their efforts to prevent air pollution in a lasting way. That is the major result of a conference which brought together the ministers responsible for environmental protection in these three countries in Lucerne on Wednesday and Thursday. Notably the ministers agreed that it was urgent to assure the supplying of unleaded gas in order to promote catalytic converter technology, Chief of the Federal Department of the Interior Alphons Egli said during a press conference.

The three ministers--Friedrich Zimmermann for the FRG, Kurt Steyrer for Austria and Alphons Egli for Switzerland--agreed to the study of atmospheric pollution as one of the causes for the decline of forests, continued Egli. In 1986, at the latest, regular unleaded gas will be available in sufficient quantities in the three countries. The three governments will launch a campaign to encourage the spread of this type of motor fuel throughout Europe.

Swiss Initiative

The three administrators also laid the groundwork for the OECD conference at the end of March 1985 in Basel which will deal with transportation of dangerous wastes across international borders. It was Switzerland which took the initiative in this area. The FRG and Austria will also participate in this conference. Finally, the ministers discussed protection of the soil and waterways as well as a quality seal for those products which will not harm the environment. They will continue their talks next February in Austria.

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30 Oct 1984